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The legal system relies heavily on the contribution of forensic psychologists. 
These psychologists give opinions on a defendant’s ability to stand trial, their legal sanity 
at the time of the crime, their future dangerousness, and their competency to be executed. 
However, we know little about what extrinsic factors bias these experts. I assessed the 
influence of gruesome photographs on forensic psychologists’ evaluations of competency 
and legal sanity. Previous research has demonstrated that these photographs influence lay 
judgments of guilt. I predicted that gruesome color photographs (versus the same 
photographs in black-and-white or a textual description of the photographs) would 
influence forensic psychologists to judge the defendant competent and sane (decisions 
that might ultimately lead to punishment). I also predicted that this effect would be 
greater for sanity judgments than for competency judgments. I asked laypeople to make 
the same decisions in order to compare expert and lay judgments. I predicted that impact 
of photograph type seen in experts would be greater in the lay sample. No differences in 
judgments of competence, sanity, or mental illness emerged as a function of the type of 
visual information, for either expert or lay participants. Experts relied on competency 
evidence to make competency judgments and insanity evidence to make insanity 
judgments. In contrast, lay people relied on various types of evidence to make their 
ultimate judgments. This research suggests that people making competency and sanity 
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In recent years, the reliability of many areas of forensic science have fallen under 
intense scrutiny (National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the 
Forensic Science Community, 2009; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology, 2016). The reliability of forensic psychological judgment and its use in court 
has also been called into question publicly (Childress, 2013), in the courts (United States 
v. Roland), and in the scientific community (Acklin, 2016). Yet the reliability of forensic 
psychology has received relatively less attention than other areas of forensic science.  
Psychologists are often hired in the legal setting to advise judges and lawyers on 
psychological issues regarding capacity (the ability to make informed legal decisions), 
defendants’ competency (the ability to assist to carry out legal decisions) and/or sanity, 
custody evaluations, etc. (Neal, 2018). These forensic judgments help legal actors make 
important decisions, such as whether a defendant is competent to understand the legal 
proceedings well enough to stand trial, whether the defendant was sane at the time of the 
crime, and whether a prisoner should be paroled. Guarnera and Murrie (2017) conducted 
a thorough examination of the field reliability of forensic evaluators’ judgments and 
found disagreement in 15% to 30% of competency decisions, 25%-35% of sanity 
decisions, and approximately half of conditional release (i.e. parole) decisions. Similarly, 
Acklin (2016) examined the field reliability of forensic judgments in Hawaii’s state court 
and found adequate interrater agreement in competency decisions, marginal agreement in 
criminal responsibility decisions, and poor agreement in conditional release decisions. 
Ideally, if two experts reviewed the same case and made the same judgment they 
would reach a similar conclusion; that is, that the judgments would be reliable. Yet, 
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experts often disagree—what is the source of this disagreement? Research suggests that 
some of the disagreement might result from forensic psychologists being biased by extra-
legal factors (i.e., legally irrelevant factors, for review, see Wells, 1978). However, we 
know little about what specific factors might bias them. The current research investigates 
one such factor that is very common in any case that involves a violent transgression: 
whether or not the expert has been exposed to emotionally disturbing evidence. First, I 
review current research on potential biases in forensic judgment. Second, I will propose a 
novel potentially biasing factor in forensic psychological judgment: emotionally 
evocative case evidence by drawing from the literature on the impact of emotional 
evidence on jurors’ judgments. Third, I will review research comparing experts versus lay 
judgments in forensic settings to hypothesize whether the effect of emotional evidence on 
jurors is likely to generalize to forensic psychologists. Finally, I will describe two 
experiments designed to be the first test of the causal impact of being exposed to 
emotionally disturbing photographic evidence on forensic judgments of competency and 
insanity by a lay sample (Study 1) and an expert sample (Study 2). 
Review of the Literature 
Forensic Judgments 
In the legal system, forensic psychologists advise lawyers, judges, and juries 
about legal questions involving psychology (Neal, 2018). They provide a service, often 
interviewing or assessing someone, with the purpose of informing the legal system. 
Forensic psychologists are often used in cases involving child custody, estate plan 
validity, legal competency, and legal sanity. All the conclusions made by forensic 
psychologists have serious practical implications on people’s lives. For example, a 
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forensic psychologist’s conclusion on custody might impact a child’s contact with his 
parents; a forensic psychologist’s conclusion about competency to make a will might 
impact a spouse’s inheritance, and decisions in criminal competency and insanity might 
impact whether the state is able to prosecute and punish a defendant. 
Because forensic judgments have a direct impact on many lives, it is important 
that these judgments are as reliable as possible. That is, if several experts all reviewed a 
case and made a judgment, ideally they would all reach similar conclusions so that the 
legal system can feel confident about relying on their opinions. If the conclusions change 
depending on characteristics of the expert who happened to be hired or extralegal biasing 
factors, there is a risk that two similar cases might be treated drastically different by the 
legal system based on which expert happened to be hired or contextual factors that might 
have given rise to extralegal bias. Additionally, if forensic judgments are not reliable, the 
public and the courts might begin to doubt the validity of these judgments in general, 
making it difficult for forensic psychologists to assist these people in making their 
decisions. One way to ensure reliability in forensic psychological judgment is to identify 
and control variables that might bias these judgments. 
There are two types of variables that might bias forensic experts: estimator 
variables and system variables (Wells, 1978). Estimator variables are factors that might 
affect forensic experts’ evaluations that are not under the control of the legal system. 
Researchers have identified two key estimator variables that might contribute to 
evaluators’ different decisions: evaluator personality and evaluator attitudes. Regarding 
personality, forensic evaluators who scored higher in agreeableness rated offenders as 
less psychopathic than those who scored lower in agreeableness (Miller, Rufino, 
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Boccaccini, Jackson, & Murrie, 2011). Regarding attitudes, forensic examiners with more 
favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense were significantly more likely to conclude 
a defendant was insane (Homant & Kennedy, 1987). Additionally, forensic examiners 
with pro-death-penalty attitudes were more likely to find a defendant competent for 
execution (Palker-Corell, 2007) and more likely to accept referrals in death penalty cases 
in the first place (Deitchman, Kennedy, & Beckham, 1991; Neal, 2016). Forensic 
judgments are also biased in ways that are consistent with the examiners’ criminal 
stereotypes (Smalarz, Madon, Yang, Guyll, & Buck, 2016). These studies identify 
extralegal factors that can bias forensic examiners’ evaluations and lead to less reliable 
judgments, but unfortunately those attitudes are not something that can be easily 
controlled by the legal system. 
In contrast to estimator variables, system variables that might influence forensic 
examiners’ conclusions are relatively more under the legal system’s control. Whereas 
estimator variables relate to specific characteristics of an examiner that cannot be 
changed (e.g. their personality traits and attitudes), system variables relate to 
environmental and situational factors that the legal system could, in theory, control if it 
had the opportunity and resources, such controlling what evidence the forensic 
psychologist sees and how they see it.  
One example of a system variable that has received attention from researchers is 
the concept of a “hiring bias”, which relates to a well-established psychological 
phenomenon: confirmation bias. Psychological research suggests that when someone is 
motivated to reach a specific conclusion, the person will selectively review evidence in a 
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way that confirms their hypothesis (e.g., Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972; for review, see, Kunda, 1990). 
Similarly, when forensic psychologists are hired by one side (e.g., hired by the 
prosecution or defense, rather than being court appointed) that expert might be—
consciously or unconsciously—motivated to reach the conclusion that favors that side. 
Indeed, forensic psychologists produced opinions that were more favorable to the side 
that hired them in both civil and criminal trials in correlational studies (Murrie et al., 
2009; Otto, 1989; Zusman & Simon,1983). This is also true when forensic psychologists 
were randomly assigned to believe they were working for the prosecution or the defense 
on a case consultation (Murrie, Boccaccini, Guarnera, & Rufino, 2013). Forensic 
evaluators’ decisions were again significantly more favorable to the side by whom they 
believed they were retained—highlighting the causal role and eliminating potential 
confounds and selection effects in the correlational studies. Thus, psychologists are 
susceptible to confirmation bias when they are motivated to reach a certain result due to 
extralegal biasing information. However, addressing this hiring bias would be relatively 
difficult to change—it would mean changing the system such that experts are hired by the 
court rather than one party or are blinded to the hiring party. Additionally, calling the 
experts’ awareness to this bias might not be effective as many suffer from a “bias-
blindspot.” That is, while experts might acknowledge that their colleagues are susceptible 
to bias, they believe that they are immune from bias. (Neal & Brodsky, 2016; Neal & 
Brodsky, 2014).  
A more controllable system variable is thinking about what types of evidence the 
experts are exposed to. Being exposed to evidence that is not necessarily relevant to the 
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specific forensic judgment they are tasked with (e.g., competency) but is highly 
suggestive of guilt or innocence might bias the expert’s judgment in a confirmatory 
direction. For example, being exposed to other evidence, such as confessions (Kassin, 
Bogart, & Kerner, 2011) and eyewitness identifications, (Charman, Gregory, & Carlucci, 
2009) can instigate a motivated analysis of forensic evidence that significantly increases 
the chance that the forensic evaluator’s conclusion is consistent with that unrelated 
evidence. These motivated interpretations of forensic evidence, in turn, reduce the 
accuracy of the forensic evaluator’s conclusion (for review, see, Kassin, Dror, & 
Kukucka, 2013). Biasing information can influence an expert in different directions, 
depending on the valence of the other evidence. For example, a fingerprint examiner is 
more likely to conclude that a suspect’s fingerprint does not match the crime scene 
fingerprint if they learn that the suspect has an alibi and more likely to conclude there is a 
match if they learn that the suspect confessed (Dror & Charlton, 2006). This suggests that 
forensic judgment is not always independent from other evidence and that this process 
can create a “snowball effect” (Dror, 2012; Kassin et al., 2013), wherein forensic 
psychologists’ judgments can become biased in the same direction as other experts’ 
opinions in the case.  
The current research focuses on another variable that might create confirmation 
bias in forensic psychologists’ judgment: motivation to see a defendant punished in court 
due to seeing emotionally disturbing photographs of a murder victim. If impactful, this 
variable suggests a relatively simple intervention of either not including such evidence or 
presenting it in a manner that would reduce its emotional impact. Despite the vast 
research on why forensic examiners reach differing conclusions, there is very little 
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research on the way that being exposed to different types of evidence influence forensic 
psychologists’ decisions, specifically, nor the impact that their emotional responses to a 
case might have on their decisions.  
Emotional Evidence 
Although there has been no research on how being exposed to gruesome 
photographs influences forensic psychologists’ judgments, research regarding the impact 
of gruesome photographs on jurors’ decisions can provide insight their potential impact 
on forensic psychologists. A growing number of studies have demonstrated that viewing 
gruesome photographs can make mock jurors render more pro-prosecution and pro-
plaintiff judgments relative to reading verbal descriptions of the victim’s injuries (for 
review, see Grady, Reiser, Garcia, Koeu, & Scurich, 2018). Specifically, seeing 
gruesome photographs increases guilty verdicts (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; 
Douglas, Lyon & Ogloff, 1997; Edwards & Mottarella, 2014; Matsuo & Itoh, 2015; 
Salerno, 2017) and the severity of sentences (Finkelstein & Batounis, 2010) in criminal 
trials. In the civil realm, viewing gruesome photographs also results in more liable 
verdicts (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) and higher damage awards (Oliver & 
Griffit, 1976; Whalen & Blanchard, 1982). A recent meta-analysis has demonstrated that 
gruesome photographs have a small, but significant, effect on guilty and liability 
judgments (Grady et al., 2018). 
Three studies have demonstrated that this effect was mediated, or explained by, 
the anger (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) and disgust (Salerno, 2017) the 
photographs elicited. The impact of gruesome photographs on verdicts is eliminated, 
however, when they are presented in black-and-white instead of color because they elicit 
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less disgust (Salerno, 2017). It is possible that gruesome photographs might have a 
similar impact on forensic psychologists: motivating them to reach evaluations that are 
more likely to result in the defendant being convicted and punished (i.e., “pro-
punishment” judgments) when they are confronted with gruesome photographs, such as 
concluding that the defendant is competent to stand trial and legally sane. 
Theoretical Framework: How Emotion Affects Legal Judgments 
Gruesome photographs increase negative emotions (Bright & Goodman-
Delahunty, 2006; Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Douglas et al., 1997; Edwards & 
Montarella, 2004; Salerno, 2017), which can impact legal judgments directly and 
indirectly (Feigenson & Park, 2006; Feigenson, 2015; Salerno & Bottoms, 2009). Several 
psychological theories describe how emotion can affect judgments via direct and indirect 
routes (Affect Infusion Model, Forgas, 1995; Culpable Control Model, 2000).  
First, feeling anger and disgust can affect judgments directly because they create a 
need to blame and punish someone (e.g., Ask & Pina, 2011; Keltner et al., 1993; Molho 
et al., 2017). For example, anger and disgust elicited by a case creates an emotion-based 
need to punish, which in turn motivates mock jurors to be more confident in a guilty 
verdict (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). Second, feeling negative emotions can affect 
judgments indirectly by instigating a biased and motivated processing of other evidence 
to support blaming someone (Forgas, 1995; Alicke, 2000). For example, mock jurors who 
see gruesome photographs that rile anger and disgust might be motivated to pay more 
attention to prosecution evidence and less attention to defense evidence, which in turn 
might increase pro-prosecution judgments. In support, mock jurors who see gruesome 
photographs rate the prosecution’s overall case as stronger (Bright & Goodman-
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Delahunty, 2006), are less likely to take the defendant’s difficult childhood (i.e., 
mitigating pro-defense evidence) into account (Nunez, Schweitzer, Chai, & Myers, 
2015), and render verdicts less sensitive to strong (versus weak) defense evidence 
(Salerno, 2017).  
I will test whether these emotion theories of decision-making demonstrated in 
jurors will generalize to forensic psychologists. Much like being hired by the prosecution, 
seeing gruesome photographs of a murder victim might create a motivation to see the 
defendant prosecuted and punished might instigate a biased processing of the evidence 
they review to make their judgments. When the experts review the gruesome photographs 
of a murder victim, they might similarly feel anger and disgust, which might create a 
similar emotion-based need to punish seen in jurors, and in turn, lead to judgments that 
will make punishment more likely (i.e., concluding the defendant is competent to stand 
trial and legally sane). The photographs might also influence judgments by causing the 
experts to pay more attention to or place more weight on evidence that supports 
competency and sanity and less on evidence that does not. 
Although no studies have investigated the impact of emotionally disturbing 
evidence on forensic psychologists’ judgments, rare studies testing its impact on other 
types of forensic judgments provides mixed support. Psychology students were more 
likely to make a positive fingerprint identification when presented with a high-emotional 
(compared to low-emotional) fact scenario—but only when the prints were ambiguous 
(as opposed to clear) (Dror, Peron, Hind, & Charlton, 2005). One study found no impact 
of emotional case information on fingerprint identification (Hall & Player, 2008), but 
19% of the experts included in the analysis did not read the crime scenario. Although 
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they did not exhibit a bias, 52% of the experts in the high-emotion condition reported 
being impacted by the crime description, compared to only 6% of experts in the low-
emotion condition. These studies suggest that emotional information has potential to bias 
the psychological process of making fingerprint judgments, but that experts might show 
this bias to a lesser degree than lay people. 
The impact of emotionally disturbing photographs on fingerprint judgments might 
generalize to forensic psychologists. One the one hand, research has indicated that 
psychologists are not immune to the influence of biasing information (see, e.g., Murrie, et 
al., 2013; Murrie et al., 2009; Otto, 1989; Zusman & Simon,1983). Forensic 
psychologists might have an emotion-based need to punish after seeing the photographs 
that might motivate them to find the defendant competent and sane because those 
judgments are likely to lead to conviction and harsher punishment—much like finding 
that a defendant’s fingerprint matches the fingerprint found at a crime scene is likely to 
lead to conviction and punishment. On the other hand, forensic psychologists might be 
buffered against the impact of emotional evidence on their judgments because judgments 
of legally incompetent and insane would not necessarily absolve the defendant from 
punishment. When a person is found incompetent or insane, they are not immediately 
released. A mentally incompetent person is held in a secure psychiatric facility until he is 
adjudicated competent to stand trial (see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4510(B). Similarly, a 
person who is found insane is typically held in a psychiatric facility until he is no longer 
“dangerous to himself or others” (CO. Rev. Stat. §16-8-120) or for the duration of the 
sentence he would have received had he been sane (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-502). Therefore, 
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psychologists’ emotional need for punishment might not necessitate finding the defendant 
competent and sane to satisfy their need for the defendant to be punished.  
Comparing Expert and Lay Judgments 
An important difference exists between the literature regarding laypeople’s 
emotions and judgments and forensic examiners. Forensic examiners are experts and their 
expertise might protect them from this bias. On the one hand, people assume that experts 
might be less vulnerable to emotional influences because of their expertise and training 
(e.g., judges, Maroney & Gross, 2014). Some research does indicate that biases found in 
laypeople do not generalize to experts, such as police officers (Correll et al., 2007; Mann, 
Vrij, & Bull, 2004), fingerprint examiners (Langenburg, et. al, 2009), and judges 
(Wessel, et al., 2006). One study looked at the impact of emotional testimony on judges 
versus laypeople (Wessell, et al., 2006) and found that when a rape victim displayed 
negative emotion congruent with their expectations for how a rape victim should act, 
laypeople rated them as more credible and were more likely to vote guilty relative to 
neutral emotion and positive emotion incongruent with their expectations. Judges, 
however, were buffered against the impact of the victim’s emotion; their judgments were 
unaffected. 
On the other hand, experts, such as judges and police, often exhibit similar biases 
to laypeople (e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2000; Lassiter, et al., 2007). For 
example, Guthrie and colleagues (2000) assessed the influence of five cognitive biases 
(anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representative heuristic, and egocentric biases) on 
judicial decision making. This study demonstrated that the judicial decisions were 
significantly impacted by each of the five illusions. Although the research comparing the 
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influence of emotion on judgments by lay people and experts is scarce, Maroney and 
Gross (2014) argue that, rather than assuming judges are dispassionate, judges have to be 
trained to properly regulate their emotions. 
Given that judges exhibit some of the same biases as laypeople, but not others 
(Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2002), it is important to compare experts’ and 
laypeople’s reactions to potentially biasing gruesome photographs. Given that forensic 
psychologists are, of course, human and might exhibit similar emotional influences on 
their judgments, as well as the mixed nature of the literature, I propose competing 
hypotheses about whether emotional biases will generalize to forensic psychologists 
below.  
Research Overview and Hypothesis 
 In the current research, I test the effect of viewing gruesome photographs of a 
murder victim on forensic judgments, as well as the relatively simple intervention of 
exposing forensic psychologists to B&W photographs rather than color. Additionally, I 
compared the responses of experts and laypeople to the same stimuli. In two experiments, 
participants read about a criminal case in which the defendant was evaluated for legal 
competency and insanity. All participants saw a summary of case information from a 
police report and observations from a clinical mental health evaluation. Participants were 
randomly assigned to view either photographs of the victim in (a) color, (b) black–and–
white, or (c) no photographs. I included written descriptions of the victim’s injuries 
depicted in the photograph to make sure participants in the control condition got as much 
of the information that the photographs provided as possible. Although photographs of 
the victim are relevant to the case in general, these photographs are not relevant to 
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decisions on legal competency, given that competency relates to the defendant’s current 
state of mind, not his state of mind at the time of the crime. Although crime scene 
photographs might provide information about legal sanity by providing probative 
information about insanity, the photographs still provide no more information than the 
verbal descriptions of the photographs. Additionally, I selected photographs that do not 
contain any probative information about insanity. Experts (Study 1) and laypeople (Study 
2) responded to measures designed to assess the defendant’s general mental health, 
competency, and insanity.  
 Hypotheses. Because color gruesome photographs can instigate a biased 
processing of the evidence to support blaming and punishing someone, they might 
motivate forensic judgments that will lead to the defendant being blamed and punished 
harshly (i.e., concluding he is competent to stand trial and legally sane). First, I 
hypothesized that seeing color gruesome photographs (versus B&W photographs or no 
photographs) will significantly increase competency and legal sanity judgments among 
lay people. Second, I tested competing hypotheses regarding experts. On the one hand, 
they might exhibit the same bias as laypeople given evidence that experts exhibit similar 
biases to lay people. On the other hand, experts’ expertise and experience might protect 
them against being affected by the photographs. Third, I predict that the effect of 
gruesome photographs will be significantly stronger on sanity decisions than competency 
decisions. The impact might be stronger for sanity decisions because forensic 
psychologists might believe that the information conveyed in the photographs is relevant 
to insanity judgments because insanity relates to the mental state at the time of the crime. 
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Therefore, a forensic psychologist might rely on the photographs to gather information 
about the defendant’s mental state.  
 I utilized an online format to collect a lay sample in Study 2, which enabled me to 
collect additional measures of potential mediators of my hypothesized effects, including 
the participants’ emotional response to reviewing the case evidence about the defendant’s 
injury. If the photographs significantly impact laypeople’s decision-making, I 
hypothesized a mediation process to explain this effect through negative emotion. 
Specifically, I predicted an indirect effect of gruesome color (versus black-and-white or 
no) photographs on decisions about competency and insanity through participants’ 
disgust (Salerno, 2017) and anger (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). I predicted that 
gruesome photographs will increase disgust and anger, which will lead to judgments that 
the defendant is competent to stand trial and legally sane. I predicted that black-and-white 
photographs will not increase judgments of competency and legal sanity indirectly 
through anger and disgust, based on research that indicates that black-and-white 
photographs do not impact judgments in the same manner as color photographs (Salerno, 
2017). 
Study 1 Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were 48 forensic psychologists who responded to a paper survey. Six 
participants (12.5%) were excluded because they were in one of the photograph 
conditions, but reported that they did not look at the photographs. The remaining 42 
participants were 35% female, had a mean age of 63 (SD = 10.19), and was 95% White, 
2% Hispanic, and 2% Native American. The majority of participants had experience 
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conducting competency (78%) and insanity evaluations (57%). On average, participants 
had performed 319 competency evaluations (SD = 1576.51) and 283 sanity evaluations 
(SD = 1578.38). Participants also had experience testifying about competency (73%) and 
insanity (47%). On average, participants have testified about competency 22 times (SD = 
68.28) and about insanity 11 times (SD = 35.55). 
Experimental packets were mailed to 996 forensic psychologists using a database 
of forensic psychologists’ contact information. Dr. Tess Neal has a database of forensic 
psychologists’ contact information. The database was developed by going to every state 
database of psychologists, finding every psychologist registered as a forensic 
psychologist, and finding their addresses on the Internet. The database is a population 
database that contains 2,229 psychologists. No valid address information was available 
for 241 of the psychologists. The database contains psychologists from every state; 22% 
of the database from the Northeast, 17% from the Midwest, 30% from the South, and 
31% from the West. After eliminating psychologists with no valid address, I randomly 
selected 996 forensic psychologists from the database using a random number generator. 
The sample contained participants from every state except for Oklahoma; 20.7% were 
from the Northeast, 15.6% were from the Midwest; 32.4% were from the South, and 
31.3% were from the West. 
Based on a previous study utilizing this database and resulting in a 43% response 
rate, I had anticipated a sample of 430 participants. I reasoned that even a 15% response 
rate would provide the recommended 50 participants per cell (Simmons et al., 2013) for 
our primary three-cell comparison (color/B&W/no photos). The current study, however, 
resulted in a 5% response rate. 
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Those who chose to participate read consent information, a case summary, and a 
mental health evaluation. They completed all measures and returned the materials in a 
postage-paid envelope. 
Materials 
Case stimulus. The materials were based on a real case and were reviewed by a 
licensed clinical psychologist with forensic evaluator experience for ecological validity. 
The case summary included information about the crime, the crime scene, and a verbal 
description of the victim’s injuries depicted in the photographs. The summary reported 
that the defendant is accused of killing a woman with a knife after the defendant broke 
into the victim’s house. The mental health evaluation included information typically 
present in a mental health report according to the licensed forensic psychologist who 
reviewed our materials, including information about the defendant’s current behavior, 
diagnostic information, and information about the defendant’s behavior at the time of the 
crime. To make competency ambiguous, the report includes both indicators of (a) 
incompetency (e.g., the belief that his attorneys are agents of the government) and (b) 
competency (e.g., occasional willingness to speak to his attorneys). Regarding sanity, the 
report includes both indicators of (a) legal insanity (e.g., statements that that the murder 
was necessary to protect his family from being killed by the government), and (b) legal 
sanity (e.g., the defendant’s attempt to avoid the police after he committed the murder, an 
indicator of legal sanity [Cunningham v. State, 1982]) The materials are included in 
Appendix A.  
Manipulations. The case materials included either 2 4X6 color photographs of 
the murder victim, B&W versions of the same photographs, or no photographs. If a 
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participant received photographs, the photographs came in a separate 4x6 envelope with a 
warning that read “Contains Crime Scene and Autopsy Photographs.” This was done to 
ensure that participants did not view the photographs until after they read the informed 
consent. The photographs are from an actual case and depict highly gruesome knife 
injuries to the victim’s throat. I modified the case to include information that put the 
defendant’s sanity and competency at issue. Type of judgment (i.e., competency, sanity) 
was a within-subjects factor, so all participants made both competency and legal insanity 
judgments. Participants’ experience level did not differ between the photo conditions, 
F(2, 36) = .91, p = .41.  
Measures. A general perceived mental health scale comprised nine items (e.g. 
“the defendant describes persecutory delusions”; M = 5.74, SD = .57, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.69), a competency scale comprised seven items (e.g., “the defendant’s symptoms will 
negatively affect his ability to assist counsel”; M = 5.45, SD = .89, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.78), and a legal sanity scale comprised six items (e.g., “the present offense was likely 
motivated by the delusions”; (M = 5.14, SD = 1.03, Cronbach’s alpha = .70). All items 
were assessed on 7-point scales ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
There were two ultimate judgment outcomes (“the defendant is competent to 
stand trial” [reverse coded] and “the defendant is legally insane”). All items were 
assessed on 7-point scales ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Lower 
numbers therefore indicated an outcome that was more likely to result in the defendant 
being tried and punished for the crime. 
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked how much they relied on the 
summary of the case materials, the mental health evaluation, and (in the conditions in 
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which photographs were included) the crime scene photographs on 5-point-scales ranging 
from Not at all to Very Much. Participants were also given an option to indicate that they 
did not look at the information. This question was meant to screen out people who 
indicated that they did not look at the photographs given that they were in an envelope 
that they might have chosen not to open. I excluded participants who reported that they 
did not look at the information. 
Demographics. Demographics included age, gender, and ethnicity. Years of 
experience was measured by a set of dichotomous yes/no questions assessing whether 
participants had conducted competency and sanity evaluations and whether participants 
had testified regarding competency and sanity. If participants answered yes to any of the 
experience measures, they were asked to report how many times. These measures were 
potential covariates or moderators that were not ultimately explored given the unexpected 
low power. All measures are included in Appendix A. 
Study 1 Results 
 To test the effect of gruesome photographs on competency and legal sanity 
judgments, I conducted two mixed Repeated-Measures ANOVAs with the photograph 
manipulation varying between subjects and (1) the ultimate competency versus sanity 
judgment and (2) judgments of mental health, competency, and sanity varying within 
subjects.  See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of all dependent measures for both studies. 
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Table 1. 




























5.74 (.57) 5.66 (.49) 5.84 (.78) 5.77 (.48) 
 Competency 
Scale 
5.45 (.89) 5.25 (.78) 5.81 (.85) 5.44 (1.03) 
 Insanity 
Scale 
5.14 (1.03) 5.16 (.96) 5.28 (.91) 5.01 (1.26) 
 Competency 5.05 (1.79) 5.00 (1.70) 5.00 (1.95) 5.15 (1.91) 
 Insanity 5.21 (1.68) 5.33 (1.64) 5.45 (1.51) 4.84 (1.91) 
     
Study 2 N = 275 n = 98 n = 89 n = 88 




5.45 (.81) 5.51 (.84) 5.37 (.77) 5.49 (.80) 
 Competency 
Scale 
5.35 (1.24) 5.30 (1.32) 5.47 (1.18) 5.27 (1.21) 
 Insanity 
Scale 
4.92 (1.08) 4.86 (1.16) 5.02 (.96) 4.89 (1.10) 
 Competency 4.41 (1.88) 4.31 (1.84) 4.31 (1.90) 4.63 (1.90) 
 Insanity 5.24 (1.62) 5.24 (1.55) 5.26 (1.63) 5.23 (1.69) 
 Bodily 
Awareness 
2.15 (1.03) 2.15 (1.13) 2.17 (.91) 2.15 (1.05) 
 Anger 2.86 (1.36) 2.96 (1.45) 2.73 (1.34) 2.89 (1.29) 
 Disgust 3.33 (1.39) 3.35 (1.47) 3.28 (1.38) 3.34 (1.33) 
Note: Study 1 Experience is an average of how many times an expert evaluated a 
defendant for competency and sanity and how many times an expert testified regarding 
the same. 
 
Ultimate competency and sanity judgments 
I hypothesized a significant interaction, such that seeing gruesome photographs 




























and legal sanity judgments. I also predicted that this effect would be greater for sanity 
judgments than competency judgments because the photographs are somewhat more 
relevant to sanity judgments.  
I conducted a mixed two-way Repeated-Measures ANOVA with photograph 
condition manipulated between subjects and decision type varying within subjects. There 
was no significant main effect of photograph type, F(2, 38) = .08, p = .93, ηp2 = .004 on 
either insanity or competency. There was also no significant interaction between 
photograph type and decision type, F(2, 38) = .51, p = .61, ηp2 = .03 or decision type, F(1, 












Mental health, competency, and sanity perception scales  
I tested the same interactive effect of photograph type and decision type on scales 
of perceptions of competency, sanity, and general mental health evidence. There was no 
Photograph Type 
Figure 1. The effect of photograph type on competency and sanity decisions. 
Note. Higher levels of agreement mean the participant rated the defendant as more 
incompetent and insane. Lower numbers indicate a judgment that is more likely to lead 




































significant main effect of photograph type, F(2, 39) = .61, p = .55, ηp2 = .03. nor a 
significant interaction between photograph type and decision type, F(3.71, 72.34) = .68, p 
= .60, ηp2 = .03.  
There was, however, a significant main effect of decision type, F(1.86, 72.34) = 
9.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. I ran post hoc comparisons on decision type with a Bonferroni 
correction. Participants rated the defendant as significantly more mentally ill than insane, 
p < .001. There were no significant differences between the (a) general mental health 
scale and the competency scale, p = .10, and (b) competency scale and the sanity scale, p 












Exploratory mediation analyses 
Although I did not find the hypothesized total effects of the manipulation on 
ultimate forensic judgment outcomes, I conducted post hoc exploratory additional 
Photograph Type 
Figure 2. The effect of photograph type on mental health, competency, and insanity 
scales. 
Note. Higher levels of agreement mean the participant rated the defendant as more 
mentally ill, incompetent and insane. Lower numbers indicate a judgment that is 






mediation analyses to see if I could learn anything about the indirect processes of the 
photographs’ effect on the ultimate judgments through the experts’ perceptions of the 
evidence regarding mental health, competency, and sanity. None of the indirect effects of 
our manipulation on ultimate judgments were significant through the mental health, 
competency, and insanity perceptions scales. I also conducted a moderated mediation 
model to see if those indirect effects were significantly moderated by expertise, such that 
the photographs only affect judgments among experts with relatively less experience but 
not among experts with relatively more experience (potentially obscuring the effect when 
not taking experience into account). This was, however, not the case—all indirect effects 
were non-significant at all levels of expert experience. Given that (a) none of the indirect 
or conditional indirect effects were significant, and (b) my sample size did not justify 
these more complex models I do not report them here, but have included them in 
Appendix C.  
Perceptions of evidence predicting ultimate judgments 
I conducted two multiple regressions with the three scales assessing perceptions 
of the evidence predicting ultimate judgments of sanity and then competency. Ideally, 
experts would be relying on the type of evidence specific to the judgment: their 
perceptions of the competency evidence should predict the ultimate competency 
judgment and their perceptions of the insanity evidence should predict the ultimate sanity 
judgment. I had no hypothesis regarding the impact of general mental health evidence on 
the ultimate competency and sanity judgments as this was an exploratory analysis. 
As one would hope of experts, their perceptions of the competency evidence 
significantly predicted their ultimate competency judgment, B = 1.35, SE = .30, p < .001. 
 23 
The more they agreed with the pieces of evidence supporting the components that render 
someone competent, the more that they ultimately agreed he was competent to stand trial. 
Also, their ultimate competency judgments were not significantly predicted by their 
perceptions of the general mental health evidence, B = –.16, SE = .48, p = .74 or the 
insanity evidence, B = .06, SE = .25, p = .81. 
Similarly, experts’ perceptions of the insanity scale significantly predicted their 
ultimate sanity judgments, B = 1.03, SE = .23, p < .001. The more they agreed with the 
pieces of evidence supporting the components that render someone insane, the more that 
they ultimately agreed that he was insane. Also, their ultimate sanity judgments were not 
significantly predicted by responses on the general mental health scale, B = –.14, SE = 
.43, p = .75 or the competency scale, B = .29, SE = .27, p = .30. See Table 2 for the 
bivariate correlations between all measures.  
Table 2. 
Person correlation matrix for all continuous variables, Study 1. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Incompetency      
2. Insanity .35*     
3. General Mental Health Scale .34* .35*    
4. Incompetency Scale .67** .45** .55**   
5. Insanity Scale .35* .69** .50** .51**  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Study 1 Discussion 
I proposed competing hypotheses regarding expert judgments. On the one hand, I 
predicted that seeing color gruesome photographs might increase pro-punishment 
judgments in both experts and laypeople, based on research suggesting that experts have 
similar cognitive biases as laypeople. On the other hand, I predicted that experts might be 
protected against the impact of gruesome photographs because of their expertise. These 
results suggest the latter: experts were not impacted by photograph type. I also predicted 
that the effect of photographs would be greater in sanity judgments than competency 
judgments. This hypothesis was not supported—photograph type had no effect across all 
types of judgments. Further, these results did not significantly differ across level of 
expertise. These results might indicate that expert judgments are not impacted by 
emotionally evocative photographs in the same way as lay judgments. 
Despite finding none of the predicted effects, there were two findings suggesting 
that experts are making forensic judgments in appropriate ways. First, experts rated the 
defendant significantly more mentally ill than insane. This suggests that experts are not 
conflating insanity judgments with mental illness. Experts seem to understand that the 
test for legal insanity requires more than just diagnosing mental illness. Second, multiple 
regression models demonstrated that experts are correctly using their assessment of the 
sanity evidence to inform their ultimate legal sanity judgment and their assessment of 
competency evidence to inform their ultimate legal competency judgments. Thus, experts 
appear to be correctly distinguishing between the two types of evidence without one type 
of evidence having a spill-over or tainting effect on the other type of judgment. It is 
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important to note, however, that these analyses were post-hoc in nature and therefore 
require more research before drawing strong conclusions from this finding. 
This study has several limitations that weaken my ability to conclude that experts 
are not impacted by gruesome photographs. A post-hoc power analysis revealed that, if 
the true population interaction effect size was ηp2 = .03, this study would have only a 39% 
chance of detecting the interaction given a sample of 42. Thus, the study was very 
underpowered. Support for my hypotheses might have materialized if I had obtained the 
expected response rate.  
Another limitation is that an unmeasured third variable might moderate the effect 
of photographs on judgments. Salerno (2017) suggested that gruesome color photographs 
(compared to black and white and no photographs) increase guilty verdicts through 
disgust but only among participants with relatively higher levels of bodily awareness. I 
did not include this measure because the nature of the paper survey prevented me from 
being able to control the order of measures; including the scale might have made experts 
aware that the study was about their emotional response and changed earlier answers. 
Including measures of bodily awareness and having enough power to include experience 
as a moderator might have revealed an interaction, such that the effect of the photographs 
manifest at higher levels of bodily awareness and/or lower levels of experience, which 
were obscured by my analyses that did not take these factors into account.  
Finally, this study is limited in that it did not include laypeople. Therefore, it is 
not clear whether (a) experts are buffered against the impact of gruesome photographs 
that I assumed laypeople would exhibit, or (b) laypeople might not be impacted by 
gruesome photographs when they make forensic judgments rather than juror judgments. 
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That is, gruesome photos might not impact forensic judgments for anyone—experts or 
laypeople. I addressed these three limitations in Study 2. 
Study 2 Introduction 
 In Study 2, I attempted to address three limitation of Study 1 by (a) recruiting a 
lay sample to tease apart whether gruesome photographs do not affect experts making 
forensic judgments or do not affect forensic judgments in general—regardless of whether 
the participant is an expert or layperson, (b) recruiting a large, well-powered sample, and 
(c) including additional mediators (i.e., measures of anger and disgust) and moderators 
(i.e., bodily awareness and experience/expertise).   
Emotional Mediators 
 Based on previous research, I included measures of participants’ anger and 
disgust reactions to the case evidence. Previous research suggests that photographs 
indirectly influence guilt judgments through disgust (Salerno, 2017) and anger (Bright & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). I, therefore, expected that seeing color gruesome 
photographs (versus black-and-white and no photographs) would increase anger and 
disgust responses, which would in turn lead to pro-punishment decisions that the 
defendant was competent and sane. 
Bodily Awareness Moderation 
 I also included a measure of bodily awareness, which is an individual difference 
variable reflecting the extent to which a person is chronically aware of their bodily 
sensations (Porges, 1993). The negative emotional response to the photographs might be 
infused into participants’ ultimate judgments, or indirectly affect them by biasing how 
they process and interpret case evidence (Forgas, 1995; Alicke, 2000). This should only 
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occur, however, to the degree that the participants notice and experience their emotional 
response. Salerno (2017) demonstrated this effect in mock jurors: the indirect effect of 
gruesome color photographs on verdicts through disgust occurs only among participants 
with relatively high and moderate levels of bodily awareness. 
Experience 
 Although I recruited laypeople, these people might have experience with mental 
health and gruesome photographs because of their occupations. I included a thorough set 
of measures of experience to see if experience moderated the effect of gruesome 
photographs on forensic psychological judgments. Specifically, consistent with Study 1, I 
predicted that viewing color photographs would increase judgments of competency and 
sanity, but only for participants with relatively less relevant experience. 
Study 2 Method 
Participants and Procedure 
To obtain a lay sample, I recruited 329 community members on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing website that connects 
experimenters with participants throughout the United States and is often more 
representative than other convenience samples (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
Mechanical Turk is become a popular and valid tool in jury research (Irvine, Hoffman, & 
Wilkinson-Ryan, 2018). Fifty-four (16.41%) participants were excluded for failing a 
photograph manipulation check or for taking less than five minutes to complete the study. 
The remaining 270 participants were 43% male, had a mean age of 38 (SD = 11.63), and 
were 84% White, 7% Hispanic, 9% Black, 9% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3% Native 
American Indian, and 2% Other.  
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Participants had a range of education and experience that might be relevant to 
their competency and insanity forensic judgments. Regarding experience in the law: 16% 
had served on a jury (of those 16%, 44% served on a criminal jury), 24% had been a 
victim of a violent crime, and reported being, on average, “moderately knowledgeable” 
about the law (M = 3.43, SD = .79 on 5-point scale). Participants were less experienced 
when it came to experience with mental health and the law: 2% of participants had 
performed legal competency evaluations, 2% of participants had performed legal sanity 
evaluations, and less than one percent had testified about competency and insanity. They 
reported being, on average, “knowledgeable” (M = 3.77, SD = .96 on a 5-point scale) 
with mental health more broadly. Overall, 43% of participants reported experience in at 
least one of the following relevant contexts: mental health, the law, law enforcement, 
medicine, insurance, social work, counseling, or jobs that required the participant to 
conduct psychological assessments, diagnostic evaluations, or interviewing. On average, 
participants who reported any experience had experience with 1.31 of the fields (SD 
= .91). 
Participants read consent information, read the same reports given to the experts 
in Study 1, and completed all Study 1 measures (along with additional new measures). 
Participants were paid $1.75 for their time. 
Materials  
Participants read the same case summary and completed the same measures as the 
experts in Study 1. I tried to keep the formatting and process as similar as possible, 
despite the materials being presented in an online format and sample differences. A few 
modifications and differences, however, were necessary or unavoidable. First, the 
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instructions were slightly modified because participants were not forensic psychologists 
and likely unfamiliar with the task, and to encourage them to do their best to envision 
themselves in the role of a forensic psychologist (See Appendix C). Second, I attempted 
to keep the online survey formatting as parallel as possible. The study had page breaks at 
the same places as the paper survey, and I set the survey to allow participants to go 
forward and backward among the pages, as the paper respondents could. Similarly, the 
survey questions were all on one page so they could navigate freely, as the paper 
respondents were able. Additionally, rather than embed the photographs in the survey 
pages, I designed the survey to better parallel the paper respondents who had photographs 
separately accompanying the survey that could be revisited at any time. To achieve this 
effect, participants had to choose to view the autopsy photographs by clicking a link that 
read “Contains Crime Scene and Autopsy Photographs” (similar to how paper 
respondents had to open the envelope), which opened the photographs in a separate tab 
on their browser. They were instructed to leave that tab open so that they could revisit the 
photographs whenever they wanted and provided links throughout the survey so that they 
could revisit the photos if they accidentally closed the initial tab. After participants 
completed the measures from Study 1, they advanced to a separate section of the survey 
that included additional measures. Once they completed the original measures and 
advanced to the new measure sections, however, they were no longer able to move 
backward and revisit the original questions. 
Measures. Similar to Study 1, I created a general mental health scale (M = 5.47, 
SD = .80, Cronbach’s alpha = .77), competency scale (M = 5.35, SD = 1.24, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .90), and insanity scale (M = 4.92, SD = 1.08, Cronbach’s alpha = .72).  
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I added additional measures to assess potential mediators and moderators of my 
hypothesized effect. First, I assessed participants’ emotional reactions to the crime by 
asking them to rate their anger and disgust about the victim’s injuries simultaneously on a 
grid measure. The grid is designed to discourage people from conflating their level of 
anger and disgust (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Appendix 1). Past research 
demonstrates that when measured via single parallel items the terms “anger” and 
“disgust” are often used interchangeably (Nabi, 2002; Olatunji et al., 2012), when using 
the grid measure they are correlated but not redundant (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; 
Salerno, 2017). The current research confirms the finding that the measures are correlated 
but not redundant (r = .62, p < .01). These measures were included as potential mediators 
of the effect of gruesome photographs on forensic judgments. 
Participants then completed a bodily awareness scale. Participants were asked 
about how often they are aware of ten bodily sensations in their day-to-day life on a scale 
from Never to Always (e.g., their heart racing, their palms sweating, and their breathing, 
M = 2.17, SD = 1.04, Cronbach’s alpha = .95). The scale was adopted from Porges 
(1993,) and similar scales have been used as a measure of internal reactions relating to 
experiencing emotion (e.g., Salerno, 2017; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & 
Dolan, 2004; Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, & Umeda, 2013; Wiebking, de Greck, 
Duncan, Heinzel, Tempelmann, & Northoff, 2011; Terasawa, Fukushima & Umeda, 
2013). Bodily awareness did not vary across photograph type, F(2, 267) = .03, p = .97. 
Participants reported if they worked in mental health, the law, law enforcement, 
medicine, insurance, social work, counseling, and/or jobs that required them to conduct 
psychological assessments, diagnostic evaluations, or interviewing. Participants selected 
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each field in which they had worked. Of participants with experience, 9% had experience 
in mental health, 5% had experience in law, 3% had experience in law enforcement, 25% 
had experience in medicine, 21% had experience in insurance, 9% had experience in 
social work, 7% had experience in counseling, 6% had experience conducing 
psychological assessments, 5% had experience conducing psychological diagnostic 
evaluations, and 41% had experience interviewing (outside the hiring process). I created a 
dichotomous variable representing whether the participant indicated that he or she 
worked in at least one of the fields (coded as 1), or if she did not work in any of the fields 
(coded 0). I also calculated a sum of how many fields the participant had experience with, 
but the majority of participants (83%) had experience only in one field. Given so few had 
experience in more than one field I utilized the dichotomous variable in analyses. 
Experience did not vary across photograph type, X2 (2, N = 270) = .12, p = .94.  
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Study 2 Results 
Ultimate competency and sanity judgments 
I conducted a similar mixed two-way Repeated-Measures ANOVA to test the 
interactive effect of the gruesome photograph manipulation and decision type on ratings 
of competency and sanity as in Study 1. Consistent with Study 1, no significant main 
effect of photograph type, F(2, 272) = .29, p = .75, ηp2 = .002 and there was no significant 
interaction between photograph type and decision type, F(2, 471.72) = .99, p = .37, ηp2 = 
.007. Unlike with Study 1, there was, however, a significant main effect of decision type, 
F(1, 471.72) = 94.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Participants rated the defendant as significantly 





























Figure 3. The effect of photograph type on competency and sanity decisions. 
Note. Higher levels of agreement mean the participant rated the defendant as 
more incompetent and insane. Lower numbers indicate a judgment that is more 







Mental health, competency, and sanity perception scales 
 I tested the same interactive effect of photograph type and decision type on scales 
of competency, sanity, and general mental health. Consistent with Study 1, there was not 
a significant main effect of Photograph Type, F(2, 272) = .18, p = .84, ηp2 = .001.There 
was also no significant interaction between Photograph Type and Decision Type, F(3.84, 
522.59) = 1.68, p = .16, ηp2 = .01. 
Consistent with Study 1, there was a significant main effect of decision type, 
F(1.92, 522.59) = 41.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. I ran post hoc comparisons on decision type 
with a Bonferroni correction. This revealed a different pattern, however, relative to 
experts (who rated the defendant as significant more mentally ill than incompetent and 
legally insane, which did not differ from each other). Consistent with Study 1, 
participants rated the defendant significantly more mentally ill than insane, p < .001. In 
contrast to Study 1, participants rated the defendant as significantly more incompetent 
than insane, p < .001. There was no difference in ratings on the general mental health 
scale and the competency scale, p = .37. This means that participants rated the defendant 





Moderated mediation: Participant experience 
Because Study 2 had more power, I was able to conduct moderated mediation 
models to test whether (a) the gruesome photographs affected participants’ ultimate 
competency and sanity judgments through their perceptions of the mental health, 
competency, and insanity evidence as well as their emotional responses and (b) these 
indirect effects were weaker for participants with relatively more experience with related 
issues (e.g., the law, mental health evaluations). Specifically, I tested a model examining 
the indirect effect of photograph type on competency and sanity judgments through 
emotional responses (i.e., anger, disgust), and their assessment of the different types of 































Figure 4. The effect of photograph type on mental health, competency and sanity 
scales. 
Note. Higher levels of agreement mean the participant rated the defendant as 
more mentally ill, incompetent and insane. Lower numbers indicate a judgment 







parallel mediators, with participant expertise as a dichotomous moderator of the a path 
and b paths. Expertise might moderate the a path by moderating the effect of photographs 
on (a) their emotional responses (i.e., participants with experience might have less strong 
emotional reactions to gruesome photographs given they have been exposed to similar 
things before), and/or (b) their assessment of the evidence (i.e., participants with 
experience who are less affected by the photographs might not engage in as much biased 
processing of the evidence). Expertise might also moderate the b path by buffering the 
effect of the mediators on judgment. That is, participants might be better at correcting for 
the biasing effect of the gruesome photographs and adjust their responses on their 
ultimate forensic judgment measures. See Figure 5 for a diagram of the model. 
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Figure 5. The indirect effect of photograph type on ultimate forensic judgments through 
anger, disgust, and mental health, competency, and sanity scales, moderated by 
experience. I tested the model twice, once with ultimate competency judgments and the 
other with ultimate sanity judgments. 
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I hypothesized that there would be an indirect effect of photograph type on 
competency and sanity ratings through disgust (Salerno; 2017) and anger (Bright & 
Goodman-Delahunty; 2006). Specifically, I predicted that when a participant saw color 
photographs (versus black and white or no photographs), the participant would feel 
greater disgust and greater anger, which would in turn would lead the participant to 
render more pro-punishment judgments. I also hypothesized that the color (versus B&W, 
or no) photographs would increase competency and insanity judgments by influencing 
how they interpreted the evidence (i.e., competency, sanity, mental health perceptions 
scales). Due to the overall null findings of Study 1 among experts, I hypothesized that the 
indirect effects of the photograph manipulation would have a greater impact when 
participants reported no experience then when they reported experience. 
Ultimate competency judgments. None of the indices of moderated mediation 
were significant. That is, none of the indirect effects of the gruesome photographs on 
ultimate competency judgments depended on participants’ experience. All indices of 
moderated mediation are listed in Table 3. 
Further, the moderated mediation analysis on ultimate competency judgments 
revealed no significant indirect effect of photographs on ultimate competency judgments 
through anger; disgust; or perceptions of mental health, competency, or sanity regardless 






Indices of moderated mediation for the indirect effect of gruesome photographs 
on ultimate competency judgments depending on participants’ experience. 
    
 Index SE CI 
Anger    
 B&W v. No Photos –0.08 0.11 –0.37, 0.08 
 Color v. No Photos –0.007 0.07 –0.15, 0.12 
Disgust    
 B&W v. No Photos 0.03 0.10 –0.12, 0.32 
 Color v. No Photos –0.008 0.04 –0.12, 0.68 
Mental Health Scale    
 B&W v. No Photos 0.03 0.17 –0.27, 0.40 
 Color v. No Photos 0.02 0.07 –0.09, 0.19 
Competency Scale    
 B&W v. No Photos –0.24 0.22 –0.76, 0.16 
 Color v. No Photos –0.005  0.10 –0.20, 0.20 
Sanity Scale    
 B&W v. No Photos –0.17 0.16 –0.61, 0.05 
 Color v. No Photos –0.03 0.11 –0.27, 0.18 
Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk. 
 Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk.
Table 4. 
Conditional indirect effects of photograph manipulation on competency as a function of experience. 
 
 Anger Mediator Disgust Mediator Mental Health Scale Mediator Competency Scale Mediator 
 
Sanity Scale Mediator 
                
 B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
 
B&W (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 




Experience –0.004 0.06 –0.19, 0.08 0.007 0.07 –0.08, 0.25 0.01 0.16 –0.27, 0.39 –0.06 0.18 –0.47, 0.26 –0.02 0.10 –0.37, 0.09 
Color (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 
No Experience 0.003 0.02 –0.02, 0.07 0.006 0.03 –0.03, 0.11 –0.004 0.03 –0.08, 0.03 –0.006 0.08 –0.18, 0.15 0.009 0.06 
 
–0.1, 0.15 
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Ultimate sanity judgments. Only one of the indices of moderated mediation was 
significant regarding sanity judgments. Experience significantly moderated the indirect 
effect of black and white gruesome photographs (compared to no photographs) on sanity 
evaluations through the mental health scale, Index = –0.43, SE = 0.20, 95% CI = [–0.92, –
0.12]. All other indices of moderated mediation were not significant. All indices of 
moderated mediation are listed in Table 5. 
Regarding the one significant moderated mediation index, examination of the 
conditional indirect effects (See Table 6) revealed that when participants had relevant 
experience, there was a significant indirect effect of viewing black and white (versus no) 
gruesome photographs on ratings of sanity through the mental health scale—but this 
indirect effect was not significant when participants did not have experience. More 
specifically, when participants with expertise saw black-and-white gruesome photographs 
(versus no photographs), participants rated the defendant as less mentally ill, B = –.42, SE 
= .18, p = .02, 95% CI [–.77, –.06], which in turn reduced their agreement that the 
defendant was insane, B = .84, SE = .21, p = .001, 95% CI [.42, 1.26]. In contrast, when 
participants without expertise saw black-and-white gruesome photographs (versus no 
photographs) their perceptions of the defendant’s mental health were not affected, B = 
.14, SE = .16, p = .39, 95% CI [–.17, .45]—although those perceptions were still related 
to ultimate sanity judgments, B = .54, SE = .16, p = .008, 95% CI [.23, .85].  
In summary, when participants had relevant experience being exposed to B&W 
photographs perceived the defendant as less mentally ill, which in turn reduced their 
agreement that the defendant was insane; whereas when participants had no relevant 
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experience, being exposed to B&W photographs had no significant effect on their 
perceptions of the defendant’s general mental health. Surprisingly, color photographs had 
no indirect effects on sanity judgments.  
Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk. 
 
Table 5. 
Indices of moderated mediation for the indirect effect of gruesome photographs 
on ultimate sanity judgments depending on participants’ experience. 
    
 Index SE CI 
Anger    
 B&W v. No Photos 0.02  0.08 –0.12, 0.19  
 Color v. No Photos 0.005 0.05 –0.09, 0.11 
Disgust    
 B&W v. No Photos 0.03 0.07 –0.08, 0.22 
 Color v. No Photos 0.008 0.04 –0.06, 0.12 
Mental Health Scale    
 B&W v. No Photos –0.43 0.20 –0.92, –0.12* 
 Color v. No Photos –0.01  0.04  –0.12, 0.05  
Competency Scale    
 B&W v. No Photos –0.14 0.10 –0.38, 0.01 
 Color v. No Photos 0.007 0.06 –0.10, 0.14 
Sanity Scale    
 B&W v. No Photos –0.27 0.18 –0.65, 0.06 
 Color v. No Photos –0.04 0.15 –0.34, 0.24 
     
  
Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk. 
Table 6. 
Conditional indirect effects of photograph manipulation on sanity as a function of experience. 
 
 Anger Mediator Disgust Mediator Mental Health Scale Mediator Competency Scale Mediator 
 
Sanity Scale Mediator 
                
 B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
 
B&W (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 
No Experience –0.03 0.06 –0.2, 0.05 –0.02 0.04 –0.14, 0.02 0.07 0.09 –0.09, 0.3 0.13 0.08 0.004, 0.34* 0.21 0.12 0.01, 0.5* 
 
 
Experience –0.006 0.05 –0.14, 0.08 0.0001 0.01 –0.02, 0.03 –0.35 0.17 –0.8, –0.09* –0.009 0.05 –0.19, 0.06 –0.06 0.13 –0.37, 0.17 
Color (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 
No Experience –0.008 0.02 –0.07, 0.03 0.006 0.03 –0.03, 0.11 0.005 0.03 –0.03, 0.09 –0.004 0.05 –0.12, 0.09 0.01 0.08 –0.14, 0.18 
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Moderated mediation: Bodily awareness 
 I next tested bodily awareness as a moderator of the relationship between 
gruesome photographs and ultimate forensic judgment given that it has been found to be 
a moderator of the effect of gruesome photographs on juror judgments (Salerno, 2017). I 
hypothesized that the indirect effect of photograph type on ultimate competency and 
sanity judgments through anger, disgust, and perceptions of the mental health, 
competency, and sanity evidence scales would increase as participants’ bodily awareness 
increased. See Figure 6 for a diagram of the models. 




Figure 6. The indirect effect of photograph type on competency through anger, 
disgust, and mental health, competency, and sanity scales, moderated by bodily 
awareness. I tested the model twice, once with ultimate competency judgments and the 
other with ultimate sanity judgments. 
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Because the moderator was continuous, I was not able to obtain moderated 
mediation indices from Hayes’ PROCESS macro. Examination of the conditional indirect 
effects revealed, however, that there were no significant indirect effects of photograph 
type on competency or sanity evaluations through anger, disgust, mental health, 
competency, or sanity—regardless of participants’ level of bodily awareness. All indirect 
effects are listed in Table 7 (competency) and 8 (sanity).
  
Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk.  
 Table 7. 
Conditional indirect effects of photograph manipulation on competency as a function of bodily awareness. 
  
  Anger Mediator Disgust Mediator Mental Health Scale Mediator Competency Scale Mediator 
 
Sanity Scale Mediator 
                 
 BA 
Value 
B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
  
B&W (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 





2.15 0.003 0.02 –0.03, 0.07 –0.007 0.03 –0.09, 0.04 –0.07 0.08 –0.24, 0.08 0.04 0.10 –0.05, 0.35 0.10 0.10 –0.08, 0.32 
 High BA 3.16 0.02 0.07 –0.06, 0.25 –0.07 0.08 –0.33, 0.03 –0.03 0.18 –0.34, 0.38 –0.006 0.14 –0.09, 0.55 0.19 0.16 –0.04, 0.61 
 Color (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 
Low BA 1.06 –0.002 0.02 –0.06, 0.02 –0.002 0.02 –0.05, 0.02 –0.004 0.02 –0.07, 0.02 –0.02 0.07 –0.17, 0.11 –0.10 0.11 –0.36, 0.08 
 Moderate 
BA 
2.14 0.001 0.007 –0.009, 0.03 –0.001 0.01 –0.03, 0.02 0.0001 0.02 –0.04, 0.04 –0.004 0.02 –0.06, 0.04 0.0001 0.07 –0.13, 0.14 





Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk. 
 Table 8. 
Conditional indirect effects of photograph manipulation on sanity as a function of bodily awareness. 
  
  Anger Mediator Disgust Mediator Mental Health Scale Mediator Competency Scale Mediator 
 
Sanity Scale Mediator 
                 
 BA 
Value 
B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
  
B&W (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 





2.15 0.03 0.05 –0.02, 0.20 –0.006 0.04 –0.13, 0.04 0.005 0.03 –0.04, 0.1 0.09 0.10 –0.05, 0.35 0.05 0.07 –0.03, 0.25 
 High BA 3.16 0.05 0.12 –0.08, 0.41 0.004 0.15 –0.28, 0.36 0.003 0.07 –0.11, 0.18 0.05 0.14 –0.09, 0.55 0.18 0.20 –0.06, 0.71 
 Color (vs. No) Gruesome Photographs 
 
 
Low BA 1.06 0.003 0.03 –0.03, 0.08 –0.002 0.03 –0.07, 0.03 –0.007 0.04 –0.1, 0.05 –0.02 0.09 –0.23, 0.14 –0.07 0.08 –0.27, 0.05 
 Moderate 
BA 
2.14 0.005 0.02 –0.03, 0.06 0.001 0.02 –0.03, 0.06 –0.0001 0.02 –0.04, 0.05 –0.009 0.05 –0.11, 0.09 0.00 0.05 –0.1, 0.1 
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Perceptions of evidence predicting ultimate judgments 
Next I conducted two similar multiple regressions as the regressions I conducted 
for Study 1. Unlike experts, who relied on only competency evidence when making 
competency judgments and insanity evidence when making insanity judgments, non-
experts forensic judgments were driven by several types of evidence. 
Ultimate competency judgments. As with the experts, lay perceptions of 
competency evidence significantly predicted their ultimate competency judgment, B = 
.48, SE = .32, p < .001. The more they agreed with the pieces of evidence supporting the 
components that render someone competent, the more that they ultimately agreed he was 
competent to stand trial. Unlike with the experts, lay perceptions of insanity evidence 
also significantly predicted their ultimate competency judgment, B = .44, SE = .13, p = 
.001. The more they agreed with the pieces of evidence supporting the components that 
render someone sane, the more that they ultimately agreed he was competent to stand 
trial. Responses on the ultimate competency judgment were not significantly predicted by 
responses on the general mental health scale, B = –.17, SE = .15, p = .26, participant 
anger, B = –.15, SE = .09, p = .11, or participant disgust, B = .04, SE = .09, p = .69. 
Ultimate insanity judgments. Again, as with the experts, lay perceptions of the 
insanity scale significantly predicted their ultimate sanity judgment, B = .71, SE = .09, p 
< .001. The more they agreed with the pieces of evidence supporting the components that 
render someone insane, the more that they ultimately agreed that he was insane. Unlike 
with the experts, lay participants’ ultimate sanity judgments were also significantly 
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predicted by their perception of the general mental health evidence, B = .44, SE = .10, p 
< .001 and their perception of competency evidence, B = .20, SE = .07, p = .006. The 
more they agreed with the pieces of evidence supporting the components that render 
someone mentally ill or incompetent, the more that they ultimately agreed that he was 
insane. Participant anger, B = –.02, SE = .06, p = .76, and participant disgust, B = .10, SE 
= .06, p = .10, did not predict ultimate sanity judgments. See Table 9 for the bivariate 
correlations between all measures. 
Table 9. 
Person correlation matrix for all continuous variables, Study 2. 
 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Incompetency          
2. Insanity .45**         
3. General Mental 
Health Scale 
.21** .54**        
4. Incompetency 
Scale 
.46** .56** .47**       
5. Insanity Scale .41** .69** .53** .62**      
6. Anger –.12* .02 .03 –.07 –.02     
7. Disgust –.04 .04 –.05 .04 –.07 .56**    
8. BA .08 .03 –.04 –.01 .002 .05 .06   
9. Experience –.003 .01 .02 –.02 –.006 .06 –.06 .13*  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Study 2 Discussion 
I predicted that seeing color gruesome photographs (rather than black and white 
photographs or no photographs) would significantly increase lay judgments of 
competency and sanity (pro-punishment judgments). This hypothesis was not confirmed. 
Consistent with the expert sample in Study 1, there was no main effect of photograph on 
forensic judgments and also no significant interaction between photograph type and 
decision type. Participants rated the defendant significantly more legally insane than 
legally incompetent in their ultimate judgments but participants agreed with evidence that 
the defendant was insane less than evidence indicating he was incompetent or mentally 
ill. This inconsistency suggests the laysample was not relying on their assessment of the 
relevant evidence appropriately when making their ultimate judgments.  
The consistency between the null findings among experts in Study 1 and a larger 
lay sample provides support for the argument that gruesome photographs do not affect 
forensic judgments. Of note, the effect size for the interaction was smaller in this study 
(ηp2 = .007) than in Study 1 (ηp2 = .03). Because the interaction was smaller than expected 
based on the Study 1 effect size, this study was still relatively underpowered A post-hoc 
power analysis revealed that, if the true population interaction effect size was ηp2 = .007, 
this study would have only a 65% chance of detecting the interaction given a sample of 
275. An a priori power analysis based on the Study 2 effect size suggests that I would 
need 606 participants to detect the effect. Thus, I cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that the null findings are due to low power. 
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I also hypothesized that there would be an indirect effect of photograph type on 
ultimate competency and sanity judgments through disgust (Salerno, 2017) and anger 
(Bright & Goodman-Delahunty; 2006). I predicted that this indirect effect would occur 
only when the participant had no experience because there was no significant effect of 
photograph type on judgments in the expert sample. This hypothesis was not confirmed. 
There were no significant indirect effects of photograph type on judgments through anger 
and disgust regardless of expertise.  
There was a significant indirect effect of black and white photographs (compared 
to no photographs) on sanity evaluations through the mental health scale when 
participants had expertise and significant indirect effects of black and white photographs 
(compared to no photographs) on sanity evaluations through the competency and insanity 
scales when participants had no expertise. This means that when participants had the 
relevant experience, exposure to black and white photographs led them to perceive the 
defendant was less mentally ill, which in turn led them to perceive the defendant as less 
insane. This finding was unexpected and difficult to interpret and could be a Type 1 error 
given the number of conditional indirect effects that were tested. Thus, I will not draw 
conclusions from this finding unless replicated in the future. 
I also hypothesized that when participants had relatively higher levels of bodily 
awareness, their judgments would be indirectly influenced by the photographs through 
anger and disgust. This hypothesis was also not supported. In fact, anger and disgust were 
not correlated with any assessments of the evidence or ultimate forensic judgments with 
only one exception (i.e., the more angry participants felt, the less they agreed he was 
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legally incompetent, which would make him more likely to be tried and punished). The 
null effect of color gruesome photographs and lack of correlations among emotional 
responses and legal judgments are in stark contrast to previous work with lay people 
posing as jurors. This suggests that the null findings from Study 1 might be indicative of 
emotional responses to evidence playing less of a role in forensic judgments relative to 
the stronger role demonstrated on juror judgments. 
Finally, I conducted the same multiple regressions as I did with the expert sample 
and found that lay participants do not only rely on sanity information to make sanity 
judgments and competency information to make competency judgments. Rather, lay 
participants rely on multiple sources of information when making their judgments. This is 
potentially a demonstration of an expertise effect: the experts might be better at applying 
appropriate evidence to their judgments better than lay people without training. 
General Discussion 
Two studies were designed to test the effect of gruesome crime scene photographs 
on forensic psychological judgments of competency and legal insanity. These two studies 
tested three primary hypotheses, all of which were largely unsupported. First, viewing 
color gruesome photographs (compared to black-and-white or no photographs) did not 
impact expert judgments about competency or legal sanity. Second, only viewing 
gruesome photographs in black-and-white (compared to no photographs) influenced lay 
judgments on sanity and it did so indirectly in ways that were difficult to interpret. Third, 
across both studies, gruesome photographs did not have a greater impact on either 
insanity or competency judgments. These results suggest that gruesome photographs do 
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not have an impact on judgments of competency and legal sanity. However, these are just 
two studies and more research is needed before I support this null conclusion confidently. 
I did find some evidence of a potential expertise effect. Experts appropriately 
relied on sanity facts to make sanity decisions and competency facts to make competency 
decisions. Their pattern of judgments also demonstrated recognition that evidence of a 
mental illness is necessary, but not sufficient to consider someone legally insane. Lay 
participants did not successfully differentiate between evidence relevant to competency 
versus sanity. Further, the pattern of their assessment of sanity and competency evidence 
did not correspond to their ultimate sanity and competency judgments. This lends support 
to the idea of an expertise effect: experts were more appropriately applying relevant 
evidence to make forensic judgments regarding competency and legal sanity than were 
laypeople. Although this finding was a secondary analysis that was not hypothesized a 
priori, it suggests that our null findings regarding the gruesome photographs might be a 
true null effect, rather than a problem with our methodology or sample.  
Relation to Previous Research on Gruesome Photographs  
This research is inconsistent with previous research demonstrating that gruesome 
photographs increase pro-prosecution/plaintiff judgments (i.e., judgments that directly or 
indirectly make punishment more likely; Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006, 2011; 
Douglas et al., 1997; Edwards & Mottarella, 2014; Finkelstein & Bastounis, 2010; 
Matsuo & Itoh, 2015; Oliver & Griffit, 1976; Salerno, 2017; Whalen & Blanchard, 1982). 
This research is also inconsistent with two previous mediation analyses indicating that 
gruesome photographs increase pro-punishment decisions by increasing negative 
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emotions (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Salerno, 2017). This is particularly 
noteworthy given that my current studies used the same gruesome photographs as three 
previous studies demonstrating they do have an effect on juror judgments (Bright and 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Salerno, 2017). Thus, it is unlikely that my null results are 
due to a less successful manipulation. 
There are, however, several methodological differences that might explain why 
my findings are different from previous gruesome photograph studies. First, in one of my 
studies, participants were selected from a different population: forensic psychologists. 
These experts might have more experience with gruesome photographs than members of 
the general population and might therefore be less influenced by them. However, this 
explanation does not address why the participants in Study 2 were not influenced by the 
photographs. 
Second, participants in this study were asked to fill a different role than 
participants in the previous studies—that of a forensic psychologist. It could be that 
placing participants in that mindset, as opposed to the mindset of a juror, reduced the 
need to punish the defendant. Jurors are charged with deciding a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence; in contrast, my participants were charged with evaluating the defendant’s 
mental state. It is possible that they did not feel the same need to punish as they would 
have if they were acting as jurors. It is also possible that it is not appropriate to have 
classified competency and sanity as “pro-punishment” judgments. Participants might be 
aware that people who are found incompetent and insane are still punished in some way. 
However, if this was the case, one might expect that to depend on experience. That is, 
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participants with relevant experience (i.e., experts in Study 1, laypeople in Study 2 with 
experience in the legal system or mental health profession) should have been more likely 
to know that incompetent and insane defendants are still punished and been less likely to 
show the effect—but more naïve participants should have shown the effect. Given that 
relevant experience did not moderate the indirect effect of photograph type on judgment 
through emotion and reveal an effect among naïve participants, it might be the case that 
nobody considers these judgments to be related to punishment. Replication would be 
required, however, before significant conclusions can be drawn about these null findings. 
Further, in addition to potential differences in participants’ perceived role, the judgments 
they are making are very different. My study did not include guilt, liability, or 
punishment decisions (as all previous studies have), but rather a decision that is one step 
removed from the guilt determination—in fact, in the current study guilt was not even 
contested.  
Third, cases that include competency and sanity issues might be fundamentally 
different than cases where guilt is in question that might be relevant to the question of 
whether gruesome photographs create an emotion-based need to punish. A judgment of 
incompetency or insanity does not necessarily clear the defendant from all punishment 
and therefore might not be related to participants’ need to punish. Further, the very fact of 
insanity might lessen the need to punish a defendant. A plea of insanity is considered an 
excuse defense. Excuse defenses are available in situations where society has determined 
that “conduct is nondeterrable, so that punishment would be so much unnecessary evil” 
(Kadish, 1987). Further, excuse defenses stand for the principle that “a person may be 
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properly blamed for her conduct ‘if, but only if, [s]he had the capacity and fair 
opportunity…freely to choose whether to violate the moral/legal norms of society’” 
(Dressler, 2012). A defendant’s insanity might function as an excuse that lessen the moral 
culpability of the defendant and therefore lessens the need to punish the defendant. 
This explanation has been hinted at by the Courts. In United States v. Freeman, 
for example, the Court argued that “the law has, for centuries, regarded [insane] wrong-
doers as improper subjects for punishment…”. Similarly, in Holloway v. United States, 
the Court argues that “to punish a man who lacks the power to reason is as undignified 
and unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or an animal. A man who cannot reason 
cannot be subject to blame.” An important step for future research would be to test what 
impact gruesome photographs might have on jurors’ judgments in cases when the 
defendant is pleading insanity to see if (a) the gruesome photographs would still increase 
guilty verdicts (i.e., the case involving an insanity issue is not the explanation for our null 
effects), or (b) the gruesome photographs would not increase guilty verdicts in this 
context (i.e., our null findings might be due to the insanity issue decreasing the need to 
punish the defendant). Alternatively, future research could replicate this research and 
include a measure of how much the defendant deserves to be convicted or punished. 
Relation to Research on Bias in Experts  
The finding that forensic psychologists are not impacted by the emotional nature 
of gruesome photographs is in line with other research that indicates that experts are 
immune to some biasing information, such as the finding that judges were not impacted 
by emotional testimony (Wessell, et al., 2006). This finding could suggest that gruesome 
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photographs might not increase the emotion felt by experts given that the experts might 
see gruesome photographs routinely as part of their everyday work and therefore might 
have become accustomed to the photographs.  
Alternatively, experts might understand that findings of incompetency and 
insanity do not lead to a lack of punishment. Incompetent defendants are typically 
detained until their competency is restored (see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4510(B)). 
Similarly, defendants who are found insane are not immediately released. Rather, the 
person is incarcerated in a psychiatric facility until either he is no longer a danger (CO. 
Rev. Stat. §16-8-120) or for the duration of the sentence he would have received (Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. §13-502). Although the specific response to an incompetent or insane 
defendant depends on the state, there is no state where incompetent or insane defendants 
are released without some form of incarceration and treatment. A forensic psychologist 
might understand that incompetency and insanity are not “get-out-of-jail-free” cards and 
that even when a defendant is found incompetent or insane, he is still subjected to 
punishment.  
These potential explanations are called into question, however, by the fact that I 
did not find a biasing effect of the photographs on laypeople’s forensic judgments. The 
lay sample is unlikely to have (a) become accustomed to gruesome photographs in their 
work, or (b) be aware of the specifics of what happens to a defendant when rendered 
legally insane—yet they also were not impacted by the photographs. Thus, it would not 
be appropriate to characterize the null finding among experts as an expertise buffering 
effect because there was no bias to be buffered against. Instead, a more likely explanation 
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is that the impact of gruesome photographs on juror judgments do not generalize to 
forensic competency and sanity judgments. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This research expands past research on emotionally evocative evidence and legal 
judgments by demonstrating that previous research focusing on juror judgments might 
not generalize to expert forensic judgments of competency and legal sanity. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study that explores how gruesome photographs influence 
expert competency and sanity judgments and revealed that they might not be susceptible 
to emotion-based biases. These studies highlight the need for future research to test the 
novel theory that emotional evidence might only affect legal judgments that have a more 
direct impact on how harshly a defendant will be punished for the transgression that 
aroused the emotion.  
This research lends support to the legal theory that insane defendants are less 
worthy of punishment (Kadish, 1987; Dressler, 2012). Participants in previous studies 
made decisions of guilt without considering issues like insanity, which might mitigate 
blame. In the current context, participants might not have felt the same need to punish 
because the defendant might be less blameworthy, because they were not in a juror role, 
and/or because the judgment was not directly connected to whether the defendant would 
be punished. 
Legal Implications 
These results suggest that gruesome photographs might not have an impact on 
experts’ forensic judgments in cases involving insanity and competency. Based on these 
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results, relevant photographs could be included in case packets given to forensic 
psychologists without limitation. However, because these results contradict previous 
research, more replication is necessary before relying on these results.  
Limitations 
Experts and laypeople might respond to biasing information differently. This 
study used both an expert and a lay sample to detect differences between expert and lay 
decision-making. This study is the first to my knowledge that studied the biasing impact 
of gruesome photographs in a competency and insanity case. This study used 
photographs from a real case to increase the ecological validity. Additionally, the 
stimulus provided participants with information that they would receive in a real case. 
This study also had limitations. First, there is no direct comparison between the 
lay sample and the expert sample because the vastly different sample sizes prevented a 
direct comparison. Descriptively speaking, experts might have been more likely to find 
the defendant incompetent (M = 5.05, SD = 1.79) than laypeople (M = 4.41, SD = 1.88) 
and less likely to find the defendant insane (M = 5.21, SD = 1.68) than laypeople (M = 
5.24, SD = 1.62). However, without an inferential direct comparison, I cannot draw any 
conclusions from this pattern. 
Second, both studies were underpowered. The expert study in particular was 
severely underpowered. Before any strong conclusions are drawn from this research, I 
need to collect a larger expert sample. I also need a larger lay sample before I draw strong 
conclusions given the very small effect size in Study 2.  
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Third, unfortunately, because I did not include dichotomous questions about 
sanity and competency, it is difficult to judge whether a ceiling effect occurred. 
Examining the frequency of responses, however, suggests this is not a great concern. In 
the expert sample, 61.9% (n = 28) of participants reported moderate to strong agreement 
with the statement “the defendant is insane,” but a substantial proportion (28.5%, n = 12) 
reported being unsure (i.e. slight agreement, slight disagreement, or neutral), and 9.5% (n 
= 4) of the sample reported moderate to strong disagreement with the same statement. In 
the lay sample, 49.6% (134) participants moderately or strongly agreed that the defendant 
was insane, 44% (n = 118) reported being unsure, and 6.7% (18) participants moderately 
or strongly disagreed with the same statement. The competency judgments exhibited a 
similar pattern: 55% (n = 23) of experts reported moderate to strong disagreement with 
the statement “the defendant is competent,” 32.8% (n = 14) reported being unsure, and 
9.8% (4) reported moderate to strong agreement with the same statement. In the lay 
sample, 36.3% (98) of participants moderately or strongly agreed that the defendant was 
incompetent, 44% (n = 119) reported being unsure, and 19% (53) participants moderately 
or strongly disagreed with the same statement. Therefore, the case facts appear to have 
resulted in a relative ambiguous judgment, which tend to make biasing effects more 
evident than would a very strong or weak case. 
Fourth, the information given to participants was significantly less information 
than a forensic psychologist usually receives. Because I was limited practically and 
because I wanted to tightly control the stimulus, participants did not interview the 
defendant or review a lengthy interview transcript or report, at least one of which is 
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typically done in real life. Instead, participants had to rely on a one-page report from 
another psychologist. When conducting real evaluations, if a psychologist does not 
interview the defendant, she is usually able to review extensive documentation from 
another psychologist. The lack of information makes these results less ecologically valid.  
Fifth, regarding the expert sample, a limitation inherent to paper surveys is that I 
had no way of controlling when participants saw the photographs (if at all) and how long 
they looked at the photographs. Although I attempted to control for this by asking 
participants to state if they did not look at the photographs (and removing participants 
who admitted that they did not look at the photographs), it is possible that some 
participants did not look at the photographs until after they read the other materials and 
began forming judgments. In fact, in addition to the 20% (6) of participants who stated 
that they did not look at the photographs (including one person who wrote a comment 
next to the question stating that he did not even see the photograph envelope until he 
came to that question), 43% (13) of participants stated that they did not rely on the 
photographs. Although it is possible that these participants did view the photographs and 
simply thought the photographs did not influence their judgments, it is also possible that 
some of these participants did not actually look at the photographs before making 
judgments. Likewise, to replicate the expert sample, lay participants in the two 
photographs conditions in the online survey were given the opportunity to look at the 
photographs but they were not required to look. Although I eliminated participants who 
reported that they did not look at the photographs and those who failed a photograph 
manipulation check, it is possible that participants who reported looking at the 
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photographs either did not look at them or did not look at them for longer than a few 
seconds. Because I kept the two experiments parallel, I have no way of knowing how 
long participants spent looking at the gruesome photographs. It is possible that a 
participant’s judgment would have been impacted by the photographs if they participant 
spent more time looking at the photograph. Although this might have weakened our 
manipulation, one could argue that this represents how forensic examiners typically 
receive photographs and can choose to look at them or not.  
Future Directions 
Future research is needed to replicate these findings. This study is inconsistent 
with a growing body of research demonstrating an impact of gruesome photographs on 
jurors’ judgments. Future research could also test whether gruesome photographs affects 
jurors’ judgments in cases that involve an insanity defense. 
Additional research should test the interactive effect of gruesome photographs and 
hiring party on forensic judgments. While there was no effect of gruesome photographs 
on forensic judgments here, it is possible that the photographs might have an effect when 
the psychologist thinks they are being hired by the prosecution. That is, when the 
psychologist thinks they are being hired by the prosecution, the psychologist might be 
motivated to find the defendant competent and sane, and therefore the psychologist might 
selectively rely on the photographs as justification for that conclusion. 
Research should also examine whether framing a participant’s role as that of a 
juror or an expert changes their judgments. Here, one key difference between this 
research and other research is that other research focused on participants as jurors and 
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this research focused on participants as experts. The change in the framing of the 
participants’ roles might have influenced their response to the evidence. That is, the very 
act of making a forensic judgment, compared to a guilt judgment, might influence a 
participant’s response to the evidence or the role itself might influence the participant’s 
response to the evidence. Future research should manipulate the type of judgment made 
(i.e. guilt judgments versus forensic judgments) and the role that the participant plays (i.e. 
juror or forensic expert). 
Finally, research should examine the differences in how experts and laypeople 
interact with information about the defendant to draw their conclusions. This research 
suggested that experts can differentiate between information relevant to competency and 
information relevant to insanity. In contrast, laypeople conflated the two issues and relied 
on competency information to make sanity decisions and vice versa. This finding has 
potential implications in the courtroom: if a defendant acts mentally ill or incompetent at 
trial, perhaps a jury would be more willing to find him insane. This finding also has 
potential implications for experts: an expert is likely capable of rendering an opinion on 
both competency and insanity without the two conclusions biasing each other. In this 
research, however, these findings were the result of a post-hoc, exploratory analysis. 
Therefore, more research is needed before I draw strong conclusions from these results. 
Conclusion 
Social psychological theory about emotion and decision making, as well as 
research on juror decision making, suggest that viewing crime scene photographs might 
bias forensic psychologists’ judgments. However, the current studies did not support this 
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theory. Although replication with well-powered studies is needed, the current research 
suggests that viewing gruesome photographs does not influence the judgments made by 
forensic psychologists. This null result is not necessarily due to their expertise buffering 
them against this bias, because there was also no evidence of a bias in lay judgments. 
Thus, the biasing effect of gruesome photographs might not affect forensic judgments 
like it affects decisions that have more direct implications for punishment (e.g., juror 
verdict and punishment decisions). This preliminary finding does not support allocating 
resources toward putting a system in place that ensures attorneys or courts avoid 
exposing forensic psychologists emotionally disturbing evidence, such as gruesome 
photographs.  
  65 
Reference List 
Acklin M. W. & Fuger K. (2016) Assessing field reliability of forensic decision making 
in criminal court, Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 16, 74–93, DOI: 
10.1080/15228932.2016.1148452. 
Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological 
Bulletin, 126(4), 556. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4510B 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-502 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-502 
Ask, K., & Pina, A. (2011). On being angry and punitive: How anger alters perception of 
criminal intent. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(5), 494-499. 
Bright, D. A., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2006). Gruesome evidence and emotion: 
Anger, blame, and jury decision-making. Law and Human Behavior, 30(2), 183. 
Charman, S. D., Gregory, A. H., & Carlucci, M. (2009). Exploring the diagnostic utility 
of facial composites: Beliefs of guilt can bias perceived similarity between 
composite and suspect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 15(1), 76. 
Childress, S. (2013). Can Juries Rely on Forensic Experts? Frontline. 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/can-juries-rely-on-forensic-experts/ 
CO. Rev. Stat. §16-8-120 
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., Wittenbrink, B., Sadler, M. S., & Keesee, T. (2007). 
Across the thin blue line: police officers and racial bias in the decision to 
shoot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(6), 1006. 
Critchley, H. D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Öhman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). Neural 
systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 7(2), 189. 
Cunningham v. State, 426 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) 
Cush, R. K., & Delahunty, J. G. (2006). The influence of limiting instructions on 
processing and judgments of emotionally evocative evidence. Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law, 13(1), 110-123. 
  66 
Deitchman, M. A., Kennedy, W. A., & Bekham, J. C. (1991). Self-selection factors in the 
participation of mental health professionals in competency for execution 
evaluations. Law and Human Behavior, 15(3), 287-303. 
Douglas, K. S., Lyon, D. R., & Ogloff, J. R. P. (1997). The impact of graphic 
photographic evidence on mock jurors’ decisions in a murder trial: Probative or 
prejudicial? Law and Human Behavior, 21, 485-501. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1024823706560 
Dressler, J. Underlying theories of excuse. In Dressler, J. (Ed.) Understanding Criminal 
Law (211–215). LexisNexis 
Dror, I. E., & Charlton, D. (2006). Why experts make errors. Journal of Forensic 
Identification, 56, 600-616. 
Dror, I. E. (2012). Cognitive bias in forensic science. In The 2012 Yearbook of Science 
and Technology. New York: McGraw-Hill., pp. 43–45. 
Dror, I. E., Péron, A. [E.], Hind, S., & Charlton, D. (2005). When emotions get the better 
of us: The effect of contextual top-down processing on matching fingerprints. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 799-809. 
Edwards, E. R., & Mottarella, K. E. (2014). Preserving the right to a fair trial: An 
examination of prejudicial value of visual and auditory evidence. North American 
Journal of Psychology, 16, 397. 
Feigenson, N. R., & Park, J. (2006). Emotions and attributions of legal responsibility and 
blame: A research review. Law and Human Behavior, 30, 143-161. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9026-z 
Feigenson, N. (2015). Jurors’ emotions and judgments of legal responsibility and blame: 
What does the experimental research tell us?. Emotion Review, 8, 26-31. DOI : 
10.1177/1754073915601223 
Finkelstein, R., & Bastounis, M. (2010). The effect of the deliberation process and jurors' 
prior legal knowledge on the sentence: the role of psychological expertise and 
crime scene photo. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 28, 426-441. DOI: 
10.1002/bsl.914 
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). 
Psychological Bulletin, 117, 39-66.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.117.1.39 
  67 
Grady, R. H., Reiser, L., Garcia, R. J., Koeu, C., & Scurich, N. (2018). Impact of 
Gruesome Photographic Evidence on Legal Decisions: A Meta-
Analysis. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1-19. 
Guarnera, L. A., Murrie, D. C., & Boccaccini, M. T. (2017). Why do forensic experts 
disagree? Sources of unreliability and bias in forensic psychology 
evaluations. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 3(2), 143. 
Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2002). Judging by Heuristic-Cognitive 
Illusions in Judicial Decision Making. Judicature, 86, 44. 
Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2000). Inside the judicial mind. Cornell 
L. Rev., 86, 777. 
Hall, L. J., & Player, E. (2008). Will the introduction of an emotional context affect 
fingerprint analysis and decision-making?. Forensic Science International, 181(1-
3), 36-39. 
Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945) 
Homant, R. J., & Kennedy, D. B. (1987). Subjective factors in the judgment of 
insanity. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 14(1), 38-61. 
Irvine, K., Hoffman, D. A., & Wilkinson‐Ryan, T. (2018). Law and Psychology Grows 
Up, Goes Online, and Replicates. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 15(2), 320-
355. 
Kadish, S.H. (1987). Excusing crime. California Law Review, 75. 
Kassin, S. M., Bogart, D., & Kerner, J. (2012). Confessions that corrupt: Evidence from 
the DNA exoneration case files. Psychological Science, 23(1), 41-45. 
Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: 
Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions. Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 2(1), 42-52. 
Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple pessimism: effects 
of sadness and anger on social perception. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 64(5), 740. 
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480. 
Langenburg, G., Champod, C., & Wertheim, P. (2009). Testing for potential contextual 
bias effects during the verification stage of the ACE‐V methodology when 
  68 
conducting fingerprint comparisons. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 54(3), 571-
582. 
Daniel Lassiter, G., Diamond, S. S., Schmidt, H. C., & Elek, J. K. (2007). Evaluating 
videotaped confessions: Expertise provides no defense against the camera-
perspective effect. Psychological Science, 18(3), 224-226. 
Mann, S., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (2004). Detecting true lies: police officers' ability to detect 
suspects' lies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(1), 137. 
Maroney, T. A., & Gross, J. J. (2014). The ideal of the dispassionate judge: An emotion 
regulation perspective. Emotion Review, 6(2), 142-151. 
Matsuo, K., & Itoh, Y. (2015). Effects of emotional testimony and gruesome photographs 
on mock jurors' decisions and negative emotions. Psychiatry, Psychology and 
Law, 1-17. DOI:10.1080/13218719.2015.1032954 
Miller, A. K., Rufino, K. A., Boccaccini, M. T., Jackson, R. L., & Murrie, D. C. (2011). 
On individual differences in person perception: Raters’ personality traits relate to 
their Psychopathy Checklist-Revised scoring tendencies. Assessment, 18(2), 253-
260. 
Molho, C., Tybur, J. M., Güler, E., Balliet, D., & Hofmann, W. (2017). Disgust and anger 
relate to different aggressive responses to moral violations. Psychological 
Science, 28(5), 609-619. 
Murrie, D. C., Boccaccini, M. T., Turner, D. B., Meeks, M., Woods, C., & Tussey, C. 
(2009). Rater (dis) agreement on risk assessment measures in sexually violent 
predator proceedings: Evidence of adversarial allegiance in forensic 
evaluation?. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 15(1), 19. 
Murrie, D. C., Boccaccini, M. T., Guarnera, L. A., & Rufino, K. A. (2013). Are forensic 
experts biased by the side that retained them?. Psychological Science, 24(10), 
1889-1897. 
Mynatt, C. R., Doherty, M. E., & Tweney, R. D. (1977). Confirmation bias in a simulated 
research environment: An experimental study of scientific inference. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 29(1), 85-95. 
Nabi, R. (2002). Anger, fear, uncertainty, and attitudes: A test of the cognitive-functional 
model. Communication Monographs, 69(3), 204-216. 
National Research Council, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science 
Community. (2009). Strengthening forensic science in the United States: A path 
  69 
forward. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf 
Neal, T. M., & Brodsky, S. L. (2014). Occupational socialization's role in forensic 
psychologists' objectivity. Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 14(1), 24-44. 
Neal, T., & Brodsky, S. L. (2016). Forensic psychologists’ perceptions of bias and 
potential correction strategies in forensic mental health evaluations. Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law, 22(1), 58. 
Neal, T. M. (2016). Are forensic experts already biased before adversarial legal parties 
hire them?. PloS one, 11(4), e0154434. 
Neal, T. (2018). Forensic psychology and correctional psychology: Distinct but related 
subfields of psychological science and practice. American Psychologist. 
Nuñez, N., Schweitzer, K., Chai, C. A., & Myers, B. (2015). Negative emotions felt 
during trial: The effect of fear, anger, and sadness on juror decision 
making. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 29(2), 200-209. 
Olatunji, B. O., Adams, T., Ciesielski, B., David, B., Sarawgi, S., & Broman-Fulks, J. 
(2012). The Three Domains of Disgust Scale: Factor structure, psychometric 
properties, and conceptual limitations. Assessment, 19(2), 205-225. 
Oliver, E., & Griffitt, W. (1976). Emotional arousal and ‘objective’ judgment. Bulletin of 
the Psychonomic Society, 8(5), 399-400. 
Otto, R. K. (1989). Bias and expert testimony of mental health professionals in 
adversarial proceedings: A preliminary investigation. Behavioral Sciences & the 
Law, 7(2), 267-273. 
Palker-Corell, A. M. (2007). Mental health professionals' decision-making in competence 
for execution evaluations. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Sam Huston State 
University, Huntsville, TX. 
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision-making, 5, 411-419 
Porges, S. (1993). Body Awareness Questionnaire. Retrieved from: 
http://stephenporges.com/images/bpq.pdf 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). (2016). Report to 
the President: Forensic science in the criminal courts: Ensuring scientific validity 
of feature-comparison methods. Washington, DC: Executive Office of the 
  70 
President of the United States. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_fore
nsic_science_report_final.pdf 
Salerno, J. M., & Bottoms, B. L. (2009). Emotional evidence and jurors' judgments: the 
promise of neuroscience for informing psychology and law. Behavioral Sciences 
& the Law, 27(2), 273-296. 
Salerno, J. M., & Peter-Hagene, C. L. (2013). The interactive effect of anger and disgust 
in moral outrage and judgments. Psychological Science, 24, 2069-2078. DOI: 
10.1177/0956797613486988 
Salerno, J. M. (2017). Seeing red: Disgust reactions to gruesome photographs in color 
(but not in black and white) increase convictions. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, 23(3), 336. 
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral 
judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1096-1109. 
Simmons, J., Nelson, L., & Simonsohn, U. (2013). Life after p-hacking. Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Social and Personality Psychology. New 
Orleans, LA. Retrieved from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205186. 
Smalarz, L., Madon, S., Yang, Y., Guyll, M., & Buck, S. (2016). The perfect match: Do 
criminal stereotypes bias forensic evidence analysis?. Law and Human 
Behavior, 40(4), 420. 
Terasawa, Y., Fukushima, H., & Umeda, S. (2013). How does interoceptive awareness 
interact with the subjective experience of emotion? An fMRI study. Human Brain 
Mapping, 34(3), 598-612. 
Terasawa, Y., Shibata, M., Moriguchi, Y., & Umeda, S. (2013). Anterior insular cortex 
mediates bodily sensibility and social anxiety. Social and Cognitive Affective 
Neuroscience, 8, 259-266. DOI: 10.1093/scan/nss108 
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966) 
United States v. Roland, 281 F. Supp. 3d 470, 472 (D.N.J. 2017) 
Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (Eds.). (1972). Thinking and reasoning. Penguin. 
Wells, G. L. (1978). Applied eyewitness-testimony research: System variables and 
estimator variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(12), 1546. 
  71 
Wessel, E., Drevland, G. C., Eilertsen, D. E., & Magnussen, S. (2006). Credibility of the 
emotional witness: a study of ratings by court judges. Law and Human 
Behavior, 30(2), 221. 
Whalen, D. H., & Blanchard, F. A. (1982). Effects of Photographic Evidence on Mock 
Juror Judgement 1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12(1), 30-41. 
Wiebking, C., de Greck, M., Duncan, N. W., Heinzel, A., Tempelmann, C., & Northoff, 
G. (2011). Are emotions associated with activity during rest or interoception? An 
exploratory fMRI study in healthy subjects. Neuroscience Letters, 491(1), 87-92. 
Zusman, J., & Simon, J. (1983). Differences in repeated psychiatric examinations of 
litigants to a lawsuit. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 140(10), 1300-1304. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/ajp.140.10.1300. 
  72 
APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 1 
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Welcome to the Legal Judgments Study! Before you begin, please read the 
information below. 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to 
investigate opinions about legal cases. We are interested in the processes by which opinions 
are reached in adjudicative competency and insanity cases. You’re being recruited because 
you are a forensic mental health expert. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to read 
information about a legal case and then to complete a questionnaire assessing your opinions 
about the defendant. We have included a postage-paid envelope for you to return all 
materials. 
RISKS: We believe that the current study poses minimal to no risk to you. You will read 
information about one of several cases. Some of the cases include potentially disturbing 
information about murder cases, such as descriptions of victims’ injuries, postmortem 
reports, photographs of victims that may show blood, and police reports detailing the events 
that occurred during the crime. The presentation is not more upsetting than what you would 
encounter if you were asked to consult on a real case. 
BENEFITS: There is no direct benefit to you anticipated from your participation in this 
study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: The data we collect will not be linked to your identity in any way. 
Although you will be asked to provide us with some personal demographic information (age, 
education, etc.), we will not ask your name or any other question that could identify who you 
are. 
RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW: You may change your mind about being in the 
study at any time, and quit after the study has started. 
QUESTIONS: If you have any questions about this research project or if you think you may 
have been harmed as a result of your participation, please contact Dr. Jessica M. Salerno at 
jessica.salerno@asu.edu. 
If you have any questions regarding your rights and participation as a research subject, or if 
you feel you have been placed at risk, please contact the ASU Chair of the Human Subjects 
INSTRUCTIONS: We have provided you a summary of information you might receive 
from an attorney to make an expert judgment in a case. It summarizes information from 
police, autopsy reports, and information distilled from a forensic mental health evaluation. 
We understand that in a real case you would receive a lot more information, and that you 
would not reach an opinion on the basis of summary data like this in the real world. 
However, in this scientific study, we are isolating the psychological processes 
underpinning decisions and your responses to the information we have given is 
informative for our purposes. We request that you respond to the questions as best as you 
can on the basis of the summary information provided. The survey will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
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Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at 
(480) 965-6788. 
 
Summary of Case Information:  
On June 17, 2012, Officer James Lee responded to an emergency call about a home invasion. 
Mrs. Janice Fisher was found in a pool of blood in the kitchen. She was pronounced dead at 
the scene by EMS. Police found a bloody knife lying in a gravel driveway of the house west 
of the Fisher residence. A photograph taken at the scene shows a major knife wound across 
her throat and several blood smudges on her face and hands. Her hands are raised slightly. 
The photograph also showed her blood-soaked clothing. The wound goes across her neck in a 
half-moon shape. 
 
Police interviewed Mr. Matthew Fisher, husband of the deceased. Mr. Fisher had been out 
getting breakfast for the couple. When he arrived home, he saw a tall man running out of the 
house. Mr. Fisher entered the house and found his wife with a slit throat, lying in a pool of 
blood. Mrs. Fisher died as her husband held her in their home while on the phone with 9-1-1 
operators. Mr. Fisher gave a description of the attacker and identified the knife found next 
door as one belonging to the couple. Police collected three relevant latent fingerprints: two on 
the knife and one on the garage door. The fingerprints and knife were sent to the lab. The 
blood on the knife was later identified as Janice Fisher’s blood and the fingerprints matched 
the defendant’s right index fingerprint (knife) and the defendant’s right thumb (knife and 
door). 
 
During canvassing, Officer Lee spoke with Eliot Stern, a neighbor of Mr. and Mrs. Fisher. He 
reported that his bicycle had been stolen from outside his garage. Officer Lee put out an all-
points bulletin (APB) with a description of the suspect and the bicycle. Officer Ken Porter 
responded to the APB, reporting that he approached a tall white male with a bicycle waiting 
at a bus stop about 1/4 mile west of the victim’s residence. Upon questioning the suspect, he 
identified himself as Erik John Kaufmann. Police report that Mr. Kaufmann was wearing 
several hats and many sweaters—even though it was a hot summer morning—and he smelled 
strongly of body odor. Mr. Kaufmann’s voice sounded shaky as he spoke with police, and he 
kept clasping his hands together and then putting him in his pockets, like he was nervous. He 
was sweating. When police asked why he was at the bus stop, he stated he was heading to 
Portland even though the bus at this stop would have been headed in the opposite direction. 
Police read Mr. Kaufmann his Miranda rights, after which he said that he “needed to rob 
somebody to get some cash and buy a house.” He stated that he needed to “get revenge on a 
whole generation for the grief they put us through” and made references to “the conspiracy.” 
He appeared to respond to voices that were not actually there, as he said “shut up! I wasn’t 
talking to you” in an apparent response to a voice that the police officers could not hear. 
Officer Porter arrested Mr. Kaufmann and took him into custody, during which Mr. 
Kaufmann said he would not talk any further to the police because the police officer was “an 
agent of the conspiracy” and that he thought the police officer intended to “kill his family.”  
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An autopsy was conducted on Mrs. Fisher. The coroner determined her death was a 
homicide. Mrs. Fisher had two large cuts across her neck, caused by something sharp with a 
long blade and died of blood loss. An autopsy photograph showing the wound from the front 
shows that the wound is roughly 2 inches wide at the front of the throat. The wound is in a 
half moon shape. There are two cuts that make up one wound. The cuts are deep enough to 
have severed the larynx. The edges of the wound appear smooth everywhere. In the 
photograph, you can see blood on her throat and her chest. 
 
 
Observations from Clinical Mental Health Evaluation: 
• Attitude and Appearance: Mr. Kaufmann demonstrated variable cooperation with the 
interview. Mr. Kaufmann’s nails and hair are very long and dirty, his breath is foul, and 
his clothing is soiled and wrinkled. 
• Psychomotor: Mr. Kaufmann exhibits normal energy. He reports sleeping normally. 
• Affect: Mr. Kaufmann displays a normal affect. 
• Speech: Mr. Kaufmann is coherent in speech. However, his responses were occasionally 
disorganized, such as when asked what he was doing in the Fisher’s home and he 
responded, “I was looking for a place to buy but then my mother called yesterday.” He 
needs occasional prompting to answer a question. When asked to describe his legal 
charges, he had to be prompted to continue after listing each charge. 
• Thought content: Mr. Kaufmann is preoccupied with the safety of his family, fearing that 
the government planned to send agents to his home to kill his family. He describes 
hearing voices that tell him how to save his family from the government. 
• Medication: Mr. Kaufmann’s use of medication has been sporadic. He expressed that the 
medication is unhelpful and makes him feel “deflated.” He expresses a desire to 
discontinue medication. 
• Previous Diagnosis: Mr. Kaufmann has previously been diagnosed with Schizophrenia, 
Paranoid Type. Medication controlled his symptoms until he stopped taking it. 
• Testing results: Mr. Kauffman was administered the Structured Interview of Reported 
Symptoms, 2nd Edition (SIRS-2) to assess for deliberate distortions of his symptoms. 
Results indicated he is not malingering.  
 
Competency-Related Information 
• On occasion, Mr. Kaufmann has expressed the belief that his “attorneys are agents of the 
government.” But on several separate occasions, he has made statements like, “I want to 
talk to my lawyer before we continue.” 
• When asked about the legal process, Mr. Kaufmann correctly stated, “the prosecution 
gets to go first then it’s my attorney’s turn.” When asked about the charges, he stated, 
“they’re saying that I meant to murder her and that I planned it ahead of time,” but when 
asked about the penalties associated with the crime, he stated “once the case is done, I get 
to go home to my family.” 
• Mr. Kaufmann stated, “The judge is unbiased and controls the courtroom” and “the jury 
decides if I’m guilty” when asked about the role of the judge and jury. He said, “the 
prosecutor’s job is to tell lies so that he can kill me” and “my attorney is going to betray 
me to the government” when asked about the role of the prosecutor and defense attorney.  
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• Mr. Kaufmann disrupted the courtroom during his first appearance by shouting “this 
generation is a disgrace!,” but has expressed an understanding that he should sit quietly 
and allow his lawyer to speak in the courtroom. 
• He has expressed that he is unconcerned about witnesses lying because he believes that 
the “voices will tell the jurors if the witness was lying.” 
• Mr. Kaufmann has expressed a clear desire to testify, explaining the belief that the 
“voices will tell the jurors that he is telling the truth.” He plans to testify even if his 





• Mr. Kaufmann has stated that he did not want to kill the victim. However, he has stated 
“the murder was necessary to protect my family.” 
• When asked what he hoped to accomplish that day, Mr. Kaufmann explained that he 
“planned to force Mrs. Fisher to give [him] money.” 
• Mr. Kaufmann stated that he “needed money from Mrs. Fisher to purchase land for [his] 
family.” 
• Mr. Kaufmann has expressed the belief that the murder was justified because he has 
“been victimized by members of her [the victim’s] generation.” 
• After he committed the crime, Mr. Kaufmann stole a bicycle. He explained that he 
planned to evade the police by using the bicycle to ride to a bus stop. He planned to take 
the bus to Portland. 
 
Diagnostic Criteria from the DSM-V for Schizophrenia 
Per Criteria A: The following details the way specific symptoms present in this case: 
1. Delusions–Mr. Kaufmann’s responses suggest he may have paranoid and persecutory 
delusions 
2. Hallucinations–There is some evidence that he is experiencing auditory and perhaps 
visual hallucinations 
3. Disorganized speech–Occasional derailment in speech. Coherent overall 
4. Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior–Not present 
5. Negative symptoms–His difficulty responding to some questions suggests some poverty 
of speech. His poor self-care suggests his activities of daily living are negatively 
impacted. 
Per Criterion B and C: Mr. Kaufmann stated his symptoms have been present for at least the 
last three years. He lost his job because he spoke to customers about his delusions and 
hallucinations. However, he reports no impact on his relationship with his wife and children. 
Per Criterion D, E, and F: There is no evidence of schizoaffective disorder or depressive 
disorder with psychotic features. Mr. Kaufmann denies using recreational drugs or 
medication. There is no history of autism. 
 



























To what extent do you agree with the following: 
1. The defendant reports low energy. ___________ 
2. The defendant describes persecutory delusions. ___________ 
3. The defendant describes auditory hallucinations. ___________ 
4. The defendant has exhibited these symptoms for several years. ___________ 
5. It appears the defendant was having a schizophrenic episode at the time of the crime. 
___________ 
6. It appears the defendant was having a schizophrenic episode at the time of the interview. 
________ 
7. The formal clinical diagnosis for the defendant’s current condition is schizophrenia. 
___________ 
8. The defendant’s mental disease or defect is severe. ___________ 
 
 
9. The duration and severity of the defendant’s schizophrenia is such that it represents “a 
mental disease or defect” as the term is used in the law. ___________ 
Competency 
The defendant’s clinical symptoms will negatively affect:  
10. … his competency-related abilities. ___________ 
11. … the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings. ___________ 
12. …the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in his defense. ___________ 
The defendant’s clinical symptoms will negatively affect:  
13. …his ability to make decisions relating to his defense (e.g. whether to take a plea bargain 
or to  
   testify in his defense). ___________ 
14. …his ability to understand the charges against him. ___________ 
15. …his ability to understand the penalties associated with the charges against him. 
___________ 
16. The defendant’s clinical symptoms will result in inappropriate behavior during trial. 
___________ 
17. The defendant is competent to stand trial. ___________ 
Insanity 
The present offense was likely motivated by:  
18. …financial gain (e.g. a murder during a robbery). ___________ 
19. … revenge. ___________ 
20. … by the hallucinations related to the schizophrenia. ___________ 
21. … the delusions related to the schizophrenia. ___________ 
22. The defendant’s clinical symptoms negatively affected his ability to appreciate the 
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23. Due to a mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. ___________ 
24. The defendant is legally insane. ___________ 
 
How much did you rely on the following information Please circle one option for each piece 
of information: 











I did not 
look at this 
information 
2. Observations from 











I did not 
look at this 
information 











I did not 
look at this 
information 
 
1. Have you performed any legal competency evaluations? (please circle one): YES   NO 
a. If yes, approximately how many competency evaluations have you performed? 
___________ 
2. Have you testified in court about competency before? _(please circle one): YES   NO  
a. If yes, approximately how many times? ___________ 
3. Have you evaluated a defendant to determine if (s)he is legally insane? (please circle 
one):  
YES NO 
a. If yes, approximately how many times? ___________ 
4. Have you testified in court about legal insanity before? (please circle one): YES   NO  
a. If yes, approximately how many times? __________ 
 
What is your gender? (please circle): MALE   FEMALE  OTHER: 
_______________________ 
 
What is your age in years? ___________________ 
 
Please specify your ethnicity (check all that apply): 
White _____. Hispanic or Latino _____. Black or African American_____. Asian/Pacific 
Islander_____ 
Native American or American Indian _____. Other (please 
specify):________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 2 
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Welcome to the Legal Judgments Study! Before you begin, please read the 
information below. 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to 
investigate opinions about legal cases. We are interested in the processes by which opinions 
are reached in cases where experts are asked to judge a defendant's competency and legal 
sanity. If you agree to participate, you will pretend you are a forensic mental health expert, a 
type of psychologist who evaluates people with mental illness within the legal system. If you 
agree to participate, you will be asked to read information about a legal case and then to 
complete a questionnaire assessing your opinions about the defendant. You will be paid 
$1.75 for your participation in the study. 
RISKS: We believe that the current study poses minimal to no risk to you. You will read 
information about one of several cases. Some of the cases include potentially disturbing 
information about murder cases, such as descriptions of victims’ injuries, postmortem 
reports, photographs of victims that may show blood, and police reports detailing the events 
that occurred during the crime. The presentation is not more upsetting than what you would 
encounter if you were asked to consult on a real case. 
BENEFITS: There is no direct benefit to you anticipated from your participation in this 
study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: The data we collect will not be linked to your identity in any way. 
Although you will be asked to provide us with some personal demographic information (age, 
education, etc.), we will not ask your name or any other question that could identify who you 
are. 
RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW: You may change your mind about being in the 
study at any time, and quit after the study has started. 
QUESTIONS: If you have any questions about this research project or if you think you may 
have been harmed as a result of your participation, please contact Dr. Jessica M. Salerno at 
jessica.salerno@asu.edu. 
If you have any questions regarding your rights and participation as a research subject, or if 
you feel you have been placed at risk, please contact the ASU Chair of the Human Subjects 
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Next, you will read materials from a legal case. We understand that you are not an expert 
and are most likely unsure about these judgments. Your responses and reactions to the 
case are still very helpful in understanding how people judge these cases. Please imagine 
that you are a forensic expert and do the best that you can based on what you read.  
The case materials include photographs of the victim in a homicide case.   
   
These photographs might be disturbing and contain blood.  
   
Below is a link that will open a separate tab in your browser with the photographs for you 
to review.   
   
Please leave this tab open so that you can revisit and review the photographs 
whenever you'd like while making your judgments about the case. 
   







INSTRUCTIONS: We have provided you a summary of information you might receive 
from an attorney to make an expert judgment in a case. It summarizes information from 
police, autopsy reports, and information distilled from a forensic mental health evaluation. 
We understand that in a real case you would receive a lot more information, and that you 
would not reach an opinion on the basis of summary data like this in the real world. 
However, in this scientific study, we are isolating the psychological processes 
underpinning decisions and your responses to the information we have given is 
informative for our purposes. We request that you respond to the questions as best as you 
can on the basis of the summary information provided. The survey will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
Please feel free to use the back arrows to revisit this information. 
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GRID INSTRUCTIONS:  
Please use this grid to indicate how angry and disgusted you feel right now. You can be 
high in both, low in both, or high in one and not the other. Along the bottom of the grid is 
how disgusted you feel, with low disgust on the left through high disgust on the right. 
Along the left side of the grid represents how angry you feel, from low anger on the 
bottom to high anger at the top. Please enter the number of the box that best represents 
how angry and disgusted you feel. 
 
For example if you were extremely angry and not at all disgusted you would enter a 5-1. 
If you were not at all angry and extremely disgusted you would enter 1-5. If you were not 
at all angry and not at all disgusted you would enter a 1-1. If you were extremely angry 
and very disgusted you would enter a 5-4. 
Please use this grid to indicate how angry and disgusted you feel SPECIFICALLY 
ABOUT THE VICTIM'S INJURIES. Her injuries can make you feel high in both, low in 
both, or high in one and not the other. Along the bottom of the grid is how disgusted you 
feel about her injuries, with low disgust on the left through high disgust on the right. 
Along the left side of the grid represents how angry you feel about her injuries, from low 
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anger on the bottom to high anger at the top.  
 
Please enter the number of the box that best matches with your level of disgust and anger 
SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE VICTIM'S INJURIES. 
 
Please enter the number of the box that lines up with your level of disgust and your level 
of anger. 
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how much you were feeling each of the following 
emotions when you heard the evidence of the victim's injuries. 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Much Very Much 
I felt anxiety  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt contempt  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt grossed-
out  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt outrage  o  o  o  o  o  
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I felt sadness  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt 
unhappiness  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt empathy 
for the victim  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt 
sympathy for 
the victim  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt pity  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt anger  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt disgust  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt interest  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt repulsed  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt fear  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt 
compassion 
for the victim  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt 
depression  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt 
happiness  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt 
infuriation  o  o  o  o  o  
I felt pleasure  o  o  o  o  o  
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Using the scale below, please indicate how much you agree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Much Very Much 





o  o  o  o  o  
I feel a desire 
to hurt the 
defendant  o  o  o  o  o  
I believe the 
defendant is 
evil to the 
core  
o  o  o  o  o  
I feel morally 
outraged by 
the defendant  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
I felt sickened  o  o  o  o  o  
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Imagine how aware you are of your body processes.  Select the answer that most 
accurately describes you.  Rate your awareness on each of the characteristics described 
below using the following 5-point scale 
During most situations I am aware of: 
 
 Never Occasionally Sometimes Usually Always 
swallowing 
frequently  o  o  o  o  o  
a ringing in 
my ears  o  o  o  o  o  
an urge to 
clear my 
throat  o  o  o  o  o  
my body 
swaying 
when I am 
standing  
o  o  o  o  o  
my mouth 
being dry  o  o  o  o  o  
 Never Occasionally Sometimes Usually Always 
how fast I am 
breathing  o  o  o  o  o  
watering or 
tearing of my 
eyes  o  o  o  o  o  
my skin 





o  o  o  o  o  
eye fatigue or 
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Did you see photographs as part of the research materials? 
o Yes, color photographs of the victim  
o Yes, black and white photographs of the victim  
o Yes, color photographs of the murder weapon  
o No, I was not given an option to see any photographs  
o No, I was given an option to view photographs but did not click on the link  
 
Display This Question: 
If participant reported viewing the crime scene photographs 
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Have you ever served on a jury? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Have you ever served on a jury? = Yes 
 
How many times? 
o Once  
o Twice  
o Three times  
o More than three times (please specify how many) 
________________________________________________ 
 
Display This Question: 
If Participant has served on one jury. 
 
What type of jury? 
o Criminal  
o Civil  
o Not sure  
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Display This Question: 
If Participant has served on more than one jury. 
What types of juries have you served on? (please select all that apply) 
▢ Criminal  
▢ Civil  
▢ Not sure  
 
Display This Question: 
If Participant served on a criminal jury. 
 
As part of  your jury service, were you asked to determine if the defendant was insane? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Not sure  
 
Display This Question: 
If Participant was asked whether defendant was insane. 
 
Did you determine that the defendant was insane? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Not sure  
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Have you or anyone close to you been a victim of a violent crime? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Not sure  
 
 
Which of the following best describes your highest education level? 
o Less than high school  
o High school graduate  
o Some college  
o 2 year degree  
o 4 year bachelor's degree  
o Professional degree  
o Doctorate  
 
What is your occupation? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) 
▢ Mental Health  
▢ Law  
▢ Law Enforcement (including but not limited to: police, crime scene 
investigation, and pathology)  
▢ Medicine  
▢ Insurance  
▢ Social Work  
▢ Counseling  
▢ A job  that required you to conduct psychological assessments  
▢ A job that required you to do psychological diagnostic evaluations  
▢ A job in which interviewing was an important and consistent part of your 
job (other than for hiring purposes)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = A job  that 
required you to conduct psychological assessments 
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Display This Question: 
If Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = A job that 
required you to do psychological diagnostic evaluations 







Display This Question: 
If Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = A job in 
which interviewing was an important and consistent part of your job (other than for hiring purposes) 
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Display This Question: 
If Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Mental 
Health 
Or Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Social Work 
Or Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Counseling 
How much experience do you have working with people with severe mental illness? 
o No experience at all  
o A little experience  
o A moderate amount of experience  
o A lot of experience  
o Very much experience  
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Law 
Or Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Law 
Enforcement (including but not limited to: police, crime scene investigation, and pathology) 
Or Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Medicine 
Or Do you work or have you ever worked in the following fields (choose all that apply) = Insurance 
 
How much experience do you have with dead bodies or people with severe injuries, 
either in person or in photographs? 
o No experience at all  
o A little experience  
o A moderate amount of experience  
o A lot of experience  
o Very much experience  
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How knowledgeable are you about the legal system? 
o Extremely knowledgeable  
o Very knowledgeable  
o Moderately knowledgeable  
o Slightly knowledgeable  
o Not knowledgeable at all  
 
How knowledgeable are you about mental health evaluations? 
o Extremely knowledgeable  
o Very knowledgeable  
o Moderately knowledgeable  
o Slightly knowledgeable  
o Not knowledgeable at all  
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Thank you so much for completing our survey! 
 







  96 
 
APPENDIX C 
STUDY 1 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES 
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Scale Creation: An experience scale was created by averaging the number of 
times the expert performed competency and sanity evaluations and how many times the 
expert testified about competency and sanity (M = 170.74, SD = 845.07, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .71).  
Mediation: Because there was no significant interaction between photograph type 
and decision type, I ran a more in-depth analysis to see if the interaction discussed above 
did not appear because it was mediated by ratings on mental health, competency, and 
sanity. See Figure 7 for the model. There was a significant direct effect of photograph 
type on competency after controlling for mental health, competency, and insanity scale 
scores, B = –1.05, SE = 0.44, 95% CI = [–1.98, –.12]. When the photographs were in 
black and white (compared to no photographs), participants rated the defendant as 
significantly more competent when controlling for mental health, competency, and 
insanity scale scores. All indirect effects were not significant. All indirect effects are 
listed in Table 10 (competency) and Table 11 (sanity). 
 
Figure 7. The indirect effect of photograph type on competency through mental 
health, competency, and sanity scales, moderated by bodily awareness. I tested the 





Indirect effect of photographs on competency. 
     
 Total Mental Health Scale as 
Mediator 
Competency Scale as 
Mediator 
Sanity Scale as Mediator 
 B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
B&W (vs. No) 
Photos 
1.05 0.56 0.05, 2.25* –0.21 0.31 –0.99, 0.27 1.27 0.72 –0.13, 
2.73 
–0.02 0.13 –0.38, 0.16 




0.24 –0.59, 0.36 –0.03 0.09 –0.37, 0.06 0.03 0.09 –0.07, 
0.33 
–0.08 0.22 –0.57, 0.31 




Indirect effect of photographs on sanity. 
     
 Total Mental Health Scale as 
Mediator 
Competency Scale as 
Mediator 
Sanity Scale as Mediator 
 B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
B&W (vs. No) 
Photos 
0.28 0.48 –0.58, 1.35 –0.03 0.25 –0.83, 0.31 0.18 0.33 –0.32, 1.04 0.13 0.37 –0.6, 0.91 
Color (vs. No) 
Photos 
0.15 0.27 –0.44, 0.63 0.02 0.08 –0.07, 0.30 0.14 0.25 –0.32, 0.66 –0.005 0.06 –0.19, 0.07 
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Moderated Mediation: The direct effect of photograph type on competency 
ratings after controlling for the three scale scores indicates that an untested variable might 
influence participant decisions. I looked to see if this direct effect existed at different 
levels of experience. Additionally, because there was no significant interaction between 
photograph type and decision type and no mediation, I ran a more in-depth analysis to see 
if the interaction and mediation existed at different levels of experience. That is, I 
attempted to rule out the possibility that the interaction above was insignificant because 
two experts of differing experience responded to the photographs in different ways. See 
Figure 8 for the models.  
Moderated mediation analysis revealed no significant indirect effects of mental 
health, competency, or sanity. All indirect effects are listed in Table 12 (competency) and 
Table 13 (sanity).  
 
 
Figure 8. The indirect effect of photograph type on competency through mental health, competency, 
and sanity scales, moderated by bodily awareness. I tested the model twice, once with ultimate 













Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk. 
Table 12: 
 
Conditional indirect effects of photograph manipulation on competency as a function of experience. 
 
 Mental Health Scale as Mediator Competency Scale as Mediator Sanity Scale as Mediator 
 Experience 
Value 
B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
 B&W (vs. No) Photos          
 Low 
Experience 
0.00 –0.08 0.52 –1.62, 0.59 0.90 1.13 –1.15, 3.32 0.04 0.28 –0.25, 1.18 
 Moderate 
Experience 
56.29 –0.29 10.52 –6.46, 2.00 1.09 7.33 –0.36, 8.06 –0.002 10.45 –2.06, 3.64 
 High 
Experience 
165.56 –0.91 88.56 –60.64, 9.65 1.04 39.27 –8.04, 30.29 0.29 111.54 –10.58, 58.45 
 Color (vs. No) Photos          
 Low 
Experience 
0.00 0.11 0.21 –0.07, 1.06 0.10 0.36 –0.64, 0.81 0.02 0.20 –0.18, 0.81 
 Moderate 
Experience 
227.15 0.23 51.55 –23.36, 124.19 0.02 57.71 –58.01, 89.89 0.19 88.03 –36.73, 210.00 
 High 
Experience 











Conditional indirect effects of photograph manipulation on sanity as a function of experience. 
 
 Mental Health Scale as Mediator Competency Scale as Mediator Sanity Scale as Mediator 
 Experience 
Value 
B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI B SE 95% CI 
B&W (vs. No) Photos          
 Low 
Experience 
0.00 0.02 0.31 –0.46, 0.77 –0.12 0.26 –1.19, 0.16 –0.11 0.49 –1.42, 0.72 
 Moderate 
Experience 
79.77 0.43 8.64 –0.38, 11.55 0.37 1.35 –0.37, 8.55 0.006 6.66 –1.3, 2.15 
 High 
Experience 
242.17 2.17 63.02 –1.28, 117.65 2.42 22.76 –3.68, 35.78 –0.03 40.30 –36.22, 7.12 
Color (vs. No) Photos          
 Low 
Experience 
0.00 –0.08 0.14 –0.61, 0.07 –0.004 0.15 –0.40, 0.25 –0.13 0.31 –1.04, 0.33 
 Moderate 
Experience 
243.69 –0.28 22.34 –137.58, 11.76 0.65 36.27 –9.00, 241.04 0.11 46.41 –33.63, 31.76 
 High 
Experience 
1219.10 –28.64 590.88 –8129.26, 120.45 7.02 957.85 –333.99, 2998.98 –11.18 1165.14 –5873.94, 231.29 
Note. Significant effects are indicated by bolded fonts and an asterisk.    
1
0
1
 
